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PSYCHOLOGICAL HEALTH AND RESILIENCE INITIATIVES 
ABSTRACT 
 The purpose of this inquiry is to understand the implications of existing U.S. 
Navy initiatives in the mental health arena aimed at improving resilience and toughness 
in Sailors. This study focuses on the impact of current Navy resilience programs on 
Sailor psychological well-being and operational unit readiness. The research was 
instrumental in identifying key characteristics required to implement a successful 
resilience program. The objective is to deliver evidence and recommendations to remove 
the programmatic issues that impede the Navy’s ability to move to scale. 
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Developing and sustaining psychological health and resilience are not new 
initiatives in the United States Navy. As operational tempo (OPTEMPO) increases and 
more demands are placed on Sailors and operational units, the need for a comprehensive 
psychological health program has never been greater. In a speech, the former acting 
Secretary of the Navy Thomas B. Modly (2020) asserted, “It’s been a long time since the 
Navy and Marine Corps team has faced this broad array of capable global strategic 
challengers. A more agile and a more resilient mentality is necessary, up and down the 
chain of command” (para. 11). While the Navy has an overarching policy addressing this 
issue, it could do more to ensure seamless integration between current initiatives. 
Additionally, there are numerous definitions for resilience and differing lexicon 
exacerbating the problem with the development of a comprehensive program. 
Multiple resilience efforts currently exist within the Navy. These efforts are led by 
numerous commands such as OPNAV N17, BUDMED M333, and NETC, CNIC to name 
a few. The first comprehensive resilience program, identified as the Navy’s Operational 
Stress Control (OSC) program, started in 2009. In April 2013, the Navy released the Task 
Force Resilient Final Report. The report addressed resilience, but its primary focus was on 
suicide in the Navy. In 2019, the Navy released NAVADMIN 222/19 to update the 
Operational Stress Control Policy under the purview of OPNAV N17 and BUMED M333. 
The policy update introduced the Expanded-Operational Stress Control (E-OSC) program 
to “empower and encourage the Navy community of Sailors, civilians and their families to 
identify signs of stress within themselves and others and know where to turn for help” 
(Department of the Navy [DON], 2019a). Alternatively, the Chief of Navy Personnel 
(CNP) directed a review of the curriculum to address the “toughness” of recruits at Recruit 
Training Command (RTC). In response, the Warrior Toughness program was developed 
and initiated with instructors and recruits at RTC in Great Lakes, IL. These two initiatives 
will be discussed in detail in Chapter IV. 
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The Navy initiatives are a testament to their leadership’s strong desire and 
motivation in improving Sailors’ mental health in preparation for maritime challenges, 
including combat. The research contained within this report aims at bridging the gap that 
exists between the Navy’s Warrior Toughness program and the Navy’s E-OSC program. 
The Warrior Toughness program is designed to be applied at the Navy accessions programs 
while E-OSC is implemented across the operational fleet. There is no clear path for 
seamlessly transitioning from the Warrior Toughness program, promoting “performance 
psychology skills to enhance performance and warfighting readiness” (Lauby et al., 2021) 
to the E-OSC, which fosters Sailor resilience. Chapter V will provide recommendations for 
greater interoperability and collaboration between the programs.  
The Navy is not alone in these efforts. For example, the Army’s pioneering efforts 
to build a resilience program in response to the increased operational tempo and sustained 
conflicts after September 11 were instrumental in bringing awareness and addressing 
psychological health issues afflicting soldiers. Additionally, the Air Force has made strides 
in development of their resilience program that also stems from the same conflicts. 
Admiral Michael Mullen, the 17th Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), 
realized the need for a framework to address the injuries suffered from the prolonged 
conflicts that impacted not only the service members but also their families, communities, 
and the nation. Injuries sustained were beyond the physical; they included mental, social, 
and spiritual. This need drove him to ask the Consortium for Human and Military 
Performance (CHAMP) at the Uniformed Services University of the Health Sciences to 
develop a comprehensive Total Force Fitness (TFF) concept (Meadows et al., 2015). 
CHAMP hosted a workshop along with the Samueli Institute, the Institute of Alternate 
Futures, and members of the JCS staff with over 70 expert participants “to define what the 
military should focus on to keep its personnel resilient and flourishing within that operating 
environment” (Meadows et al., 2015). The product developed from the workshop was the 
Military Medicine special report, a collective effort that outlined eight domains to make up 
the TFF concept. Admiral Mullen used the workshop’s output to establish the Chairman’s 
Total Force Fitness Framework, which was distributed to the DOD via the CJCSI 3504.01 
in September 2011. The Air Force fully embraced the total fitness concept and the Navy 
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utilized it in developing their E-OSC curriculum, but the other services rarely mention it in 
their resilience initiatives, programs, and policies.  
Currently, the DOD office charged with resilience for military forces is the Office 
of the Under Secretary for Personnel and Readiness – Office of Force Resiliency (OFR). 
Its mission is “to strengthen and promote the resiliency and readiness of the Total Force 
through the development of integrated policies, oversight, and synchronization of activities 
in the areas of diversity management and equal opportunity, personnel risk reduction, 
suicide prevention, sexual assault prevention and response, and collaborative efforts with 
the Department of Veterans’ Affairs” (Force Resiliency Mission, n.d.). The OFR has many 
offices within it that contribute to resilience such as Defense Suicide Prevention (DSPO), 
Office for Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion (ODEI), DOD/VA Collaboration Office 
(DVCO), Office of Drug Demand Reduction (ODDR), Sexual Assault Prevention and 
Response Office (SAPRO). In November 2011, the DOD published an instruction, 
Maintenance of Psychological Health in Military Operations, which “establishes policy 
and assigns responsibilities for developing combat and operational stress control (COSC) 
programs within the Military” (DoDI 6490.05, 2011). This instruction cancels and replaces 
DOD Directive 6490.5, Combat Stress Control (CSC) Programs. 
In addition to the DODI 6490.05, CJCSI 3405.01, the CJCS established the Total 
Force Fitness Framework that mentions resilience but does not provide direct guidance on 
establishing a resilience program. The CJCSI 3405.01 “identifies a framework for adopting 
and implementing total force fitness (TFF). The framework is a methodology for 
understanding, assessing, and maintaining Service members’ well-being and sustaining 
their ability to carry out missions” (CJCSI 3405.01, 2011). The military services employ 
TFF through their resilience initiatives and programs as they deem sufficient. The DON 
promulgated instruction 6520.1A, Operational Stress Control in June 2016. The purpose 
of this instruction was “to establish policy, guidelines, procedures, and responsibilities to 
standardize the Operational Stress Control (OSC) Program across the Navy” (DoNI 
6520.1A, 2016. This instruction has since been cancelled and replaced with two 
NAVADMINs. NAVADMIN 222/19 established the E-OSC program and NAVADMIN 
332/20, directed the program to be implemented across the fleet. 
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The research contained in this report aims to analyze two major Navy psychological 
health initiatives and how they affect the mental health of Sailors and operational units. 
Additionally, the research aims to address any gaps that exist in each program at its current 
state. The research seeks to answer the following questions: 
• What are the implications of the current Navy programs designed to 
strengthen and improve the psychological health of Sailors and operational 
units? 
• What are the programmatic issues that impede the Navy program’s ability 
to move to scale? 
B. BENEFITS OF THE RESEARCH 
The research analyzes two current Navy psychological health initiatives and 
identifies the programmatic issues that hinder a comprehensive program. This study will 
provide recommendations for improvements that will sync Navy efforts to ensure the 
mental health and well-being of sailors and organizational units are strengthened. The 
research results will help Navy senior leaders enhance policy to inform all psychological 
health initiatives to ensure program success. It will also serve to increase operational unit 
readiness by providing sailors with tools to deal with arduous duty and operational stress.  
C. SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS 
The scope of this study is assessing the psychological health and resilience 
programs of the military services through identification of key characteristics vital for 
successful program implementation. The characteristics are then applied to the various 
programs to assess program success. This report has limitations as civilian resilience 
programs were not explored. The assessment relies on the current state of the military 
programs. For the Navy specifically, there are many ongoing resilience efforts that will not 
be discussed in length. This report will concentrate on the two major resilience initiatives 
currently being implemented at the accession and fleet levels. The characteristics 
developed for analysis were informed by the literature review as well as interviews with 
Navy psychological health and resilience initiative subject matter experts (SMEs). The 
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information collection from these sources will be used rather than collecting further 
information to be translated into data. 
D. METHODOLOGY 
The methodology entails developing and describing key characteristics that will 
enhance program implementation and successful execution for a resilience program. A 
literature review of various books, journal articles, peer-reviewed studies, and RAND 
studies have lent credence to the criteria that will be used as an assessment tool for 
measuring program success. The military initiatives and programs will be analyzed 
utilizing the characteristics spelt out in the methodology section of this report. 
E. ORGANIZATION OF THE REPORT 
The introductory chapter discussed the purpose and background of the research 
pertaining to the psychological health and resilience of Navy Sailors and organizational 
units. This research introduced two current initiatives under the Navy’s purview and the 
importance of coordinating and integrating all resilience programs. 
Chapter II is the literature review. The literature review provides the foundation of 
resilience research. It highlights a few notable pioneers and briefly describes their 
contributions in the field. The literature review provides definitions for resilience by those 
pioneers as well as all the military services. Additionally, the chapter explores a RAND 
study, which sought to promote military resilience by identifying pertinent factors found 
in the resilience programs. Chapter III describes the methodology used to identify key 
characteristics for comparing the DOD military services resilience programs. Chapter IV 
presents the program analysis for DOD resilience programs to include a synopsis and 
assessment of each military service based on the characteristics identified in Chapter III. 
Lastly, Chapter V closes with the conclusion, recommendations, and areas for further 
research.  
6 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. INTRODUCTION 
In this chapter, the foundations of resilience, its definitions, and a RAND study are 
examined to enhance the framework for DOD resilience programs. The purpose of 
reviewing the resilience literature is to identify characteristics to establish a baseline for 
successful resilience program implementation in Navy organizational units. 
B. FOUNDATIONS OF RESILIENCE RESEARCH 
Over 50 years ago, researchers in the mental health sciences observed positive 
outcomes from some children despite having been exposed to extreme adversity 
(VicHealth, 2015). This observation provided the path for the study of resilience. The new 
approach allowed the focus to shift from mental illness to mental health (VicHealth, 2015). 
Today resilience research continues to thrive as segments of society have adopted the 
frameworks for resilience application in organizations and the data collected continues to 
offer a refinement of successful outcomes.  
To discuss the foundations of resilience, one must turn to the pioneers of the study 
of resilience. Some early pioneers that have written extensively on resilience and their 
contributions to the task will be discussed. While there are many notable researchers on 
resilience, this literature review will capture a brief introduction of only a few pioneers.  
Dr. Norman Garmezy is often credited as the founder of research in resilience 
(Masten & Cicchetti, 2012). He was a clinical psychologist whose distinguished career was 
rooted in schizophrenia and other mental illnesses. He led studies on children born to 
schizophrenic mothers to isolate the cognitive and social precursors of the illness (Masten 
et al., 2011). Garmezy became fascinated by children who were thriving despite having 
suffered extreme adversity (Masten et al., 2011). As a founder of Project Competence 
Longitudinal Study (PCLS) of resilience, his focus changed from psychopathology to 
“research on stress resistance, competence, and resilience” (Masten et al., 2011; VicHealth, 
2015). Garmezy’s distinguished research in resilience spans over three decades focusing 
“on the study of individuals, especially children, at risk for psychopathology and 
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developmental problems; the study of resilience; and the marriage of developmental 
sciences with clinical sciences that produced the field of developmental psychopathology” 
(Masten & Cicchetti, 2012). Garmezy’s legacy included training many leaders in 
developmental psychopathology, including Ann Masten and Dante Cicchetti (Masten & 
Cicchetti, 2012). 
Dr. Emmy Werner was a developmental psychologist whose resilience work can 
be traced back to the 1950s. She is best known for her 40-year longitudinal study of 698 
children born on the island of Kauai in 1955 (VicHealth, 2015; Werner, 1997). The purpose 
of the research was to document the pregnancies, observe the children’s physical, 
intellectual, and social development, and record physical and learning disabilities or 
behavior problems (VicHealth, 2015). Her impressive research was published in a series 
of five books which established the notable ability children had in overcoming adversity 
(Anonymous, 2012). Werner has authored multiple books on the resilience of children, 
including historical accounts of resilience. Werner’s extensive work in child resilience 
established a strong foundation for work that continues today.  
A protégé of Garmezy, Dr. Ann Masten, is regarded as an expert in resilience 
research. She is a clinical psychologist whose extensive work has centered around child 
resilience. Much of her focus is in identifying the key protective factors and adaptive 
systems a person develops stemming in childhood (Masten, 2014). She is the director for 
PCLS at the University of Minnesota (VicHealth, 2015). Her work at Project Competence 
includes investigating the long-term outcome of the relationship between parent quality 
and adolescent psychological well-being (VicHealth, 2015). Results from the study suggest 
that IQ and parent quality serve a protective role in child development concerning 
antisocial behavior (Masten et al., 1999). While much of Masten’s research has focused on 
child resilience, her work provides a window to examine the origins of human resilience 
development. It offers the groundwork for adult resilience research to blossom. Her insight 
into resilience studies and contribution to the research continues today. 
Looking back on decades of research and foundations of resilience provides 
appreciation and legitimacy of the discipline. It is apparent how the research and 
application of resilience outcomes relate to the adversity that service members are exposed 
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by the nature of their careers. The development of resilience programs throughout the DOD 
may signal that resilience is a remarkable trait; however, research suggests that resilience 
is common. According to Sutcliffe and Vogus (2003), “[r]ather than being rare and 
extraordinary, reoccurring themes spanning multiple literatures and levels of analysis 
suggest that resilience emerges from relatively ordinary adaptive processes that promote 
competence, restore efficacy, and encourage growth, as well as the structures and practices 
that bring about these processes.” The DOD’s integration of resilience programs is 
encouraging and demonstrates its commitment to the health of its most precious resource, 
its people. 
C. DEFINITIONS OF RESILIENCE 
The term resilience is assigned a wide variety of definitions. In researching the 
discipline of resilience, the definitions offered by the pioneers and military services are 
examined.  
Dr. Norman Garmezy defined resilience as “not necessarily imperviousness to 
stress. Rather, resilience is designed to reflect the capacity for recovery and maintained 
adaptive behavior that may follow initial retreat or incapacity upon initiating a stressful 
event” (Garmezy, 1991). In Garmezy’s definition of resilience, he aligns with the classical 
understanding of resilience by having the quality of bouncing back from an impactful 
event.  
Dr. Emmy Warner defined resilience as “the capacity to cope effectively with the 
internal stresses of their vulnerabilities (liable patterns of autonomic reactivity, 
developmental imbalances, unusual sensitivities) and external stresses (illness, major 
losses, and dissolution of the family)” (Werner, 1982). Warner studied resilience in 
children; thus, in the context of children, she described resilient children in the following 
passage, “Even in the most discordant and impoverished homes, and beset by physical 
handicaps, some children appear to develop stable and healthy personalities, and display a 
remarkable degree of resilience in the face of life’s adversities” (Werner, 1989).  
Last, Dr. Ann Masten’s insight on what resilience means has been instrumental in 
the development of resilience literature. In her book, Ordinary Magic Resilience in 
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Development (2014), Masten speaks of the origins of the term resilience. She discloses that 
the term resilience “comes from the Latin verb resilire (to rebound).” In an attempt to 
capture the meaning of resilience across many contexts, she describes resilience as, “the 
capacity (potential or manifested) of a dynamic system to adapt successfully to 
disturbances that threaten system function viability, or development; positive adaptation or 
development in the context of significant adversity exposure” (Masten, 2014). 
Under DoDI 6490.05, “The Secretaries of the Military Departments shall:  Develop 
comprehensive [combat and operational stress control] COSC policies and programs for 
Military Service-specific operations from garrison to the battlefield” (2011). In keeping 
with the guidance provided by the DOD, it bears to reason that each of the military services 
would have Military Service-specific definitions of resilience.  
The U.S. Navy has a couple of definitions for resilience. One is the “process of 
preparing for, recovering from, and adjusting to life in the face of stress, adversity, trauma, 
or tragedy” (DON, 2013). The other definition for resilience found on the Navy Leader’s 
Guide for Managing Sailors in Distress webpage is “the ability to cope effectively with 
life challenges” (DON, 2012). 
The Marine Corps defined resilience in the MCTP 3-30E Combat and Operational 
Stress Control publication as “the ability to withstand adversity without becoming 
significantly affected, as well as the ability to recover quickly and fully from whatever 
stress-induced distress or impairment has occurred” (United States Marine Corps [USMC], 
2016). The Marine Corps definition of recovery uses the word “quickly.” The word 
“quickly” is a subjective word that may set unrealistic expectations. Questions arise 
regarding how certain factors can be measured. For instance, how does one measure 
resilience using time as a factor when analyzing how “quickly” one recovers from 
adversity. The measurement can be very disparate from hours to years, which makes it 
difficult to properly analyze resilience using time. Werner provides the following statement 
in reference to time from an interview, “I think it is important to take a long-term 
perspective, because resilience is a process that takes time” (Werner, 2012). 
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According to the Army Recovery Care Program webpage, “[r]esilience is the 
mental, physical, emotional and behavioral ability to face and cope with adversity, adapt 
to change, recover, learn and grow from setbacks” (Department of the Army, 2021). 
Likewise, the Air Force adopted the Defense Centers of Excellence for Psychological 
Health and Traumatic Brain Injury (DCoE) definition of resilience, “the ability to 
withstand, recover and/or grow in the face of stressors and changing demands” (Meadows 
et al., 2015). 
The definitions of resilience are diverse among the pioneers and each of the military 
services; however, they each maintain the notion that resilience is a capacity to recover, or 
cope from exposure to adversity. It is especially noteworthy that despite the freedom 
afforded by the DoDI 6490.05 to develop a service-specific program, each service did not 
develop a definition for resilience to suit their service. Instead, they used a description that 
could be interchangeable with any other service’s definition. The research origins of the 
resilience discipline and the pioneers who molded it through longitudinal studies built a 
foundation for expectations and education in the implementation of a successful resilience 
program.  
D. RAND STUDY TO PROMOTE MILITARY RESILIENCE 
In 2011, RAND provided research and analysis related to promoting resilience in 
the military. As RAND researchers sought a general definition for the term, ‘resilience,’ 
they found, instead, an abundance of definitions for the word ‘resilience,’ which they 
cataloged in appendix A of their report. The catalog of definitions may be helpful in the 
formulation of an official DOD definition for the term resilience because, as of this 
research, the DOD has not adopted an official definition in the context of the military 
lifestyle. While the definitions for resilience are vast, so is the literature on the topic. RAND 
researchers identified 270 relevant sources and limited themselves to the most recent 
resilience-related publications between the years 2000 through 2011 (Meredith et al., 
2011). Most of the literature surrounded resilience at the individual level over group (e.g., 
family, organization, community) resilience (Meredith et al., 2011).  
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To organize a framework for resilience, researchers categorized evidence-informed 
resilience factors most frequently found in literature relating to individual, family, 
organizational (unit), and community levels  (Meredith et al., 2011). Individual-level 
factors included positive coping, positive affect, positive thinking, realism, behavioral 
control, physical fitness, and altruism. Of these factors, the traits of positive thinking, 
positive affect, positive coping, realism, and behavioral control had the most substantial 
evidence in the literature. Family-level factors identified were emotional ties, 
communication, support, closeness, nurturing, and adaptability, with family support being 
the most evidence-based factor. Unit-level factors included positive command climate, 
teamwork, and cohesion, with positive command climate garnering the most evidence. 
Finally, community-level resilience factors identified were belongingness, cohesion, 
connectedness, and collective efficacy with belongingness established as the most 
evidenced-based factors in the community-level resilience factors (Meredith et al., 2011).  
Identifying the evidence-based resilience factors helped RAND define a resilience 
program “as one that targets any of the factors that research has shown to improve 
resilience and healthy responses to stress and provides a means for helping individuals to 
incorporate resilience factors into their daily lives” (Meredith et al., 2011). The Office of 
the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs (OASD/HA) sponsored a study 
jointly conducted by RAND Health’s Center for Military Health Policy Research and the 
Forces and Resources Policy Center for the RAND National Defense Research Institute 
(NDRI) (Meredith et al., 2011). The study, published in June 2011, aimed to assist the 
DOD “in understanding methodologies that could be useful in promoting resilience among 
servicemembers and their families” (Meredith et al., 2011). While the RAND study helped 
identify a variety of recommendations for military resilience programs, this report will only 
focus on a few key themes that emerge which closely relate to the military resilience 
programs discussed in Chapter IV.  
1. Generate Policy and Doctrine for Resilience  
In June 2011, RAND published its study on military resilience programs and made 
recommendations to improve DOD Directive 6490.5. DOD Directive 6490.5 was released 
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on February 23, 1999, by the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness 
(USD P&R). The directive was a scant document with subject Combat Stress Control 
Programs which briefly outlined policy, responsibilities, and definitions of Combat Stress 
Control terms, but did not mention the word resilience once. The RAND study 
recommended the DOD “consider clear policy to define resilience, to assign roles and 
responsibilities across the services, and to provide guidance on program implementation” 
(Meredith et al., 2011).  
Within six months of the RAND study, the USD P&R published DOD Instruction 
6490.05 on November 22, 2011, canceling DOD Directive 6490.5. The revamped DOD 
Instruction demonstrated the responsiveness of the DOD in addressing shortfalls and 
recommendations provided by the RAND study. More importantly, the instruction 
provided increased guidance for leaders, roles and responsibilities, and core principles for 
COSC. Terms such as “psychological first aid” and “resilience,” which had not appeared 
in DOD directive 6490.5, were found throughout the new instruction. The instruction is 
active as of the date of this report, with the most recent change (issuing updated references, 
organizational titles, and removing expired language) effective May 29, 2020.  
2. Leadership “Buy-In” 
According to RAND findings in 2011, the most prevalent barrier to resilience 
program success is lack of leadership support. It is normal to encounter resistance to a new 
program, especially when commanders have many competing priorities and scarcity of 
time and resources. According to the report, the resiliency policy was not embraced by the 
organizational unit commanders as there was a lack of leadership guidance, which made 
the initiative seem more like an extra task rather than a tool to add value to the health of 
the command. The study recommendation entailed involving leadership early in the 
development of the program and promoting resilience at senior leadership schools 
(Meredith et al., 2011). The study made it clear that resilience initiatives had little chance 
of success without strong leadership endorsement. 
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3. Stigma 
The RAND study was eager to investigate stigma; however, the literature on stigma 
was limited. Only one document provided evidence for reducing the stigma of the 270 
papers RAND researchers reviewed (Meredith et al., 2011). Despite the lack of literature 
about stigma, the RAND study identified stigma as a barrier to program implementation. 
Many service members perceive resilience programs as treatment. Embedding resilience 
programs with mental health treatment entities only serve to increase the stigma (Meredith 
et al., 2011). One strategy that helped reduce stigma was through senior leadership support 
and involvement. Resilience program representatives found that associating resilience 
training with physical fitness training was an effective strategy in breaking down the stigma 
barrier. By aligning mental fitness to physical fitness, service members found resilience 
programs less offensive to the warrior mindset (Meredith et al., 2011).    
4. Positive Command Climate 
RAND researchers found that positive command climate had the most evidence in 
the literature for promoting resilience at the unit level (Meredith et al., 2011). A resilience 
program representative reported “positive command climate as the most important factor 
contributing to program success. One program representative described how an effective 
resilience program was terminated after a change in command because the new leader was 
less supportive of the program” (Meredith et al., 2011). Communicating early and often 
with leadership and sharing data to emphasize positive outcomes of the program were 
strategies employed to promote resilience to less favorable command climates. Another 
solution to overcome the challenge was to frame resilience as a method to support Army 
values. Unit participation in the resilience program was shown as an improved way to 
manage the commander’s unit (Meredith et al., 2011). The importance of the impact 
positive command climate has within an organizational unit sheds light on how this factor 
would be successful to a resilience program.  
5. Implementation of Program Before Evidence of Effectiveness 
A common occurrence across most resilience programs, civilian or military, is that 
they were implemented before evidence of their effectiveness. A reason for implementation 
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before evidence-based effectiveness is that programs are tailored to meet the needs of each 
client or organization. Customization of resilience programs makes it difficult to design 
studies that will yield evidence of effectiveness. Naturally, proof of effectiveness will take 
years of research. RAND recommends tracking the evaluative data and encourages the 
publication of the results (Meredith et al., 2011). Documenting the evidence-based data 
will remain critical for funding and survival of the resilience initiatives, especially for the 
military and service branches. Since it takes years of documented data to prove program 
effectiveness, the effectiveness of the Navy’s resilience initiatives cannot be measured in 
their current state.  
E. SUMMARY 
The literature review sets the foundation for the resilience framework. It provides 
key tenants and evidence-based studies that can assist those tasked with the development 
of successful resilience programs. Exposure to the historical background and resilience 
definitions will help the reader appreciate the extensive work that has been dedicated to the 
discipline in the remaining chapters of this report.  
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This chapter discusses the methodology used to analyze the Navy initiatives, and 
military service programs. The key characteristics that define a successful resilience 
program is discussed below. These characteristics will serve as the measurement to assess 
the initiatives and programs explored in Chapter IV. 
B. RESEARCH APPROACH 
The purpose of this research aims to analyze two major Navy psychological health 
initiatives and how they affect the psychological health of Sailors and operational units. 
Additionally, the study aims to address any potential gaps that exist in each program and 
whether the program can be successfully implemented at its current state. A program is 
considered successful when it meets its goals and objectives for implementation and 
execution within the organization.  
The literature review provided a historical resilience background and an 
understanding of the foundational concepts that were used to implement the respective 
programs. Peer-reviewed journals, books, RAND studies, instructions, directives, DOD 
websites, and program-specific documents were utilized to identify characteristics within 
the programs that are vital to success. Data derived from RAND’s resilience literature 
review and the DOD TFF guidance was used to analyze and make recommendations for 
further development of the Air Force program. RAND also conducted surveys and 
interviews when assessing the Marine Corps OSCAR program. The RAND studies were 
instrumental in providing an overall assessment of these two DOD resilience programs.  
Interviews were conducted with both Navy mental health professionals for the 
Warrior Toughness program at the RTC and SMEs for the E-OSC program. The purpose 
of the interviews was to gain a deeper understanding of the programs, including the history, 
detailed program descriptions, implementation, and ongoing improvements in meeting 
resilience goals. E-OSC SMEs provided preliminary data from the pilot program and plans 
for the fleet-wide rollout of the E-OSC program. Additionally, insight was provided into 
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the dynamics between the Warrior Toughness and the E-OSC programs. Key 
characteristics were developed by taking common threads between the resilience research 
and the current military programs that was proven to be successful in supporting 
individuals and units in need. 
C. KEY CHARACTERISTICS FOR ANALYSIS 
The literature review and interviews conducted with the Navy resilience program 
SMEs highlighted congruent factors among all the programs. The following characteristics 
will be used as a baseline for analysis of the military programs described in Chapter IV. 
1. Common Language 
 Arguably the most crucial characteristic regarding resilience is the use of a common 
language. As discussed in the Chapter II literature review, there are many different 
definitions of resilience. As one can imagine, with all these definitions, it makes it difficult 
to understand what resilience really is. If resilience researchers and experts cannot decide 
on one clear definition, how can an organization develop a comprehensive one? Issues arise 
from having various definitions of resilience and different terminology between initiatives 
or programs within an organization. If the initiatives or programs have different 
perspectives and objectives, it will affect how resilience is defined and subsequently how 
the program is implemented.  
There is common terminology used in describing resilience to include grit, 
hardiness, psychological health, spirituality, and toughness. This list is inclusive, but not 
exclusive as there are many more terms used in reference to resilience. Resilience is often 
described as one’s ability to bounce back after an event and even grow stronger from it. A 
successful resilience program should properly define lexicon to create a common basis of 
understanding internally within an organization to decrease confusion and risk of 
nonconformity.  
Terminology, if not accurately defined, can prove problematic in gaining 
acceptance by service members. For example, the term “spirituality” is commonly 
associated with religion. Watchdog groups, such as the Military Religious Freedom 
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Foundation (MRFF), led by founder Michael L. Weinstein, have pursued legal action 
against various services for alleged violations of service member’s religious freedom. In 
2011, the Army came under fire from the MRFF for including “spiritual fitness” as a factor 
in the CRT. The MRFF contested that the Army was “promoting religion and creating a 
religious test for its soldiers, which is prohibited by the U.S. Constitution” (Bradley 
Hagerty, 2011). In 2016, the MTFF warned the Marine Corps of a class-action lawsuit for 
its plan to integrate spiritual fitness into professional military education (Seck, 2016). The 
Army is not the only military service that incorporates the term “spirituality” in their 
resilience program; in fact, all services include an aspect of spirituality into their respective 
programs. 
There is value in preserving the term “spirituality” despite the criticism it has 
engendered. Spirituality can be a beneficial factor in resilience. A study published by 
Chaplain Gary Berg found “spiritual distress was related to both combat-related post-
traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and depression in a sample of Vietnam veterans” (Berg, 
2011). Werner provides that “faith and prayer were significantly more often reported as 
sources of support by resilient high-risk individuals than by their low-risk peers of the same 
age (33% vs 15%)” (Werner, 1989). As described in the MCTP 3-30E, “Spirituality, 
though, has a broader definition that applies even to those individuals who do not believe 
in God or do not belong to an organized religion. This broader view defines spirituality as 
an overarching source of meaning that transcends the day-to-day struggles of the individual 
and helps give life value and meaning” (USMC, 2016). While there is strong evidence to 
support the factor of spirituality related to resilience, military services should take legal 
consideration in defining the word “spirituality” if they choose to use it as a factor for a 
resilience program. 
Today, contention on the subject of religion persists as 20 conservative lawmakers 
have written letters to Secretary of Defense Mark Esper “in which they objected to the 
military’s limitations on service members’ attendance at worship services during the 
coronavirus pandemic” and “the Pentagon and services’ responses to complaints by Mikey 
Weinstein” (Miller, 2020). It is critical to maintain awareness of the contention over 
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terminology while preserving service members’ freedoms. Involving military legal counsel 
throughout the process of refining existing resilience programs is prudent. 
Another example of terminology that has become troublesome is toughness in 
respect to resilience. In the Navy, toughness is associated with the Navy SEAL. When 
applying the word toughness to resilience, there have been many different interpretations, 
which affect how the program is structured and members are trained. It is difficult for 
members to associate a term in which they do not have a close connection. There are many 
other instances where the lexicon impacts the implementation and execution of a program. 
Terminology must be carefully researched prior to applying to a resilience program. An 
organization must have a common language that is clear and unambiguous so there is no 
confusion by the members when implementing the program.  
2. Integration 
Many programs exist within organizations that relate in some way to resilience. 
Programs that fall under the resilience umbrella need to be integrated in some fashion to 
streamline efforts. A streamlined resilience program is vital to interoperability and aids in 
the reduction of redundancy. Lack of coordination and common program elements create 
redundancy between programs. If programs are redundant, they could lose the attention of 
its intended audience as well as funding. Coordination and common language will assist in 
creating harmony between programs. Issues arise when programs with similar objectives 
work in opposition or refuse to collaborate towards a common goal. Based on the 
conversations with program offices, it became apparent that fear of losing a program, a 
reduction in funding, and lack of resources are common themes as to why some programs 
are unwilling to share specifics about their program. Program objectives should be synced 
in pursuit of a common goal:  a more resilient organization that can provide psychological 
health support to those who are in need.  
3. Point of Entry  
Establishing the most effective point of entry for a resilience program is essential 
in ensuring successful implementation and execution. In the past, the point of entry was a 
medical or mental health professional. The literature and studies have shown that a clinical 
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provider is sometimes a deterrent for those seeking help because of the stigma it carries. 
General George Casey provided, “I felt that we would receive the greatest traction if CSF 
became a command program sewn into the fabric of Army operations and leadership. It is 
here—at the unit level—where we will have the greatest chance to attain a cultural change 
within the Army. This decision also acknowledges a fundamental program tenet: CSF is a 
training program—not medical treatment—and training is the leadership’s responsibility” 
(Casey, 2011). The point of entry needs to be an upstanding individual within the 
organizational unit that others seek out for advice. A good understanding of how the 
organization works and intimate details of the personnel within the organization is a must. 
Other characteristics that will make for a strong point of entry are humble, admirable, 
trustworthy, hardworking, down to earth, and personable. These traits will make the point 
of entry less intimidating and more approachable to members who either need help or know 
of someone in need. However, they still need to hold a legitimate position of authority with 
the power to influence decision making within the organization. 
4. Training 
Numerous training programs currently exist in both military and civilian 
organizations. The sheer number of trainings that must be conducted yearly can be 
overwhelming and often viewed as redundant. While this report identifies the need for 
resilience training, choosing the level and frequency in which the training should be 
conducted is a daunting task.  
How personnel receive the training can affect the receptibility and retainability for 
the Sailors within the command. Each individual and organizational unit have unique 
characteristics, which is a reason training should be flexible in order to successfully 
implement the program. The frequency in which the training is mandated will be an 
important factor. It is important that all personnel within the organization receive initial 
training, but follow-on training should be conducted at a lower level or on an individual 
basis. 
Who will conduct the training is another critical element of the resilience training 
program. Resilience training provided to the organizational unit should be able to resonate 
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with the individuals who receive the training. One of the most successful training methods 
is train the trainer. This method gives the organization a trainer inside the unit who can 
easily relate to the members. Mass training conducted via electronic means or provided by 
senior personnel without a personal connection to the group has not been proven effective.  
In addition to who and how the training is executed, it is vital to provide the training 
at the right time. This aspect is critical, especially in military organizations. The right time 
could be different depending on an organization’s mission, deployment timeline, extended 
stay at home periods, or other events that create stressors. Another opportune time for 
training would be on an individual level when someone self-reports or when leaders or 
peers identify signs that someone needs help. This type of training would be one-on-one 
so the training team could assess the appropriate level of support the individual requires. 
The goal of resilience training is to equip individuals and organizations with the 
tools to identify signs of distress and difficulty with coping within themselves and their 
peers and the resources to address any issues. Resilience training must be adequately 
planned, implemented, and executed within the organization to improve and strengthen the 
psychological health of its members. 
5. Leadership 
The role of leaders will be crucial in enabling implementation and execution of a 
successful resilience program at the organizational unit level. The tone set at the top by 
senior leaders through policies and procedures will demonstrate their commitment to 
resilience and the psychological health of the unit and its members. According to the 
MARADMIN 045/20 (2020), “Commanders are encouraged to develop strong local 
policies that support best practices for OSCAR training implementation.” The RAND 
Study conducted in 2011 identified the lack of leadership support of resilience initiatives 
as a major barrier for successful program implementation. “The fundamental tools for 
prevention—selection, training, leadership, and unit camaraderie and esprit de corps—all 
lie in the hands of military leaders at all levels. Early identification of adverse stress 
reactions depends largely on the awareness and attitudes promoted in a military unit by its 
commander” (Nash, 2006). While buy-in from senior leadership is essential, buy-in from 
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leadership at all levels is required for effective management of stress reactions and a 
successful program. 
Leaders are instrumental in the charge to reduce the stigma associated with mental 
health. This is a challenge for all operational unit leaders as members often associate asking 
for help with clinical mental health providers. Resilience programs are not developed to 
send every person to mental health; instead, they are designed to assess what level of care 
is required then refer them to the appropriate care. In most cases, it is not a mental health 
care provider who is best situated to deal with the issue. The most valuable role leadership 
plays in reducing the stigma is making sure all members of the organization fully 
understand the resilience program and that it is not necessarily tied to mental health. This 
issue is particularly engrained in the military culture and will take strong leadership to 
lessen the stigma surrounding military organizations that has existed for too long. The 
resilience program will be unsuccessful without leadership involvement early and 
continuously, especially when time is limited, and resources are scare. Individuals need to 
know leadership care and believe they will be supported if and when they need or ask for 
help. 
D. SUMMARY 
This chapter discussed the methods used to derive characteristics to analyze each 
of the military resilience initiatives and programs in Chapter IV. The information provided 
through literature review, RAND studies, and interviews facilitated identification of the 
factors that will be utilized to assess whether the programs successfully implemented their 
resilience programs at the organizational unit level, respectively.  
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IV. PROGRAM ANALYSIS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter will describe two of the major Navy initiatives in effect, the Warrior 
Toughness and E-OSC programs, which are related to improving both the Sailor and 
operational unit mental health and performance. Analysis of the of the Navy initiatives 
programs will provide both strengths and weaknesses regarding implementation based on 
their current applications. According to the Task Force Resilient Final Report (2013), the 
Navy identified at least 123 programs under the umbrella of resilience documented in its 
history. The task force was established to examine factors impacting the Navy’s resilience 
and make recommendations to improve its efforts. To understand the Navy’s new 
psychological health and resilience initiatives, it is essential to review historical military 
programs and approaches.  
In addition, this chapter explores the Army, Marine Corps, and Air Force resilience 
programs. All four military services have their own service specific COSC programs that 
aim to prevent, identify, and manage combat and operational stress reactions (COSRs) 
within operational units resulting from training and mission demands (COSC and the 
Services, n.d.). “Combat and Operational Stress Control (COSC) efforts seek to minimize 
the impact of stress on service members’ physical, psychological, behavioral, and social 
health as early as possible in order to promote mission readiness, increase individual and 
unit resilience and enhance mission performance” (COSC and the Services, n.d.). Each 
program will be assessed whether they meet the characteristics required for implementing 
a successful resilience program.  
The military services have taken different approaches in implementing their 
respective resilience programs based on the DOD and CJCS guidance on resilience. The 
Army program is centralized and resource intensive in facilitating execution at the 
individual level. The Marine Corps uses a decentralized leader-centric approach that offers 
implementation at lower levels (Lester et al., 2018). The Air Force resilience program is 
robust with a dedicated instruction, Air Force Instruction 90–5001 Integrated Resilience, 
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resilience website, and Flag level direction. In addition, the Air Force commissioned 
RAND to do a comprehensive resilience literature review to help them strengthen their 
current resilience initiatives and programs.  
B. NAVY INITIATIVES 
1. Warrior Toughness Program 
The Warrior Toughness Program is headed by Naval Education and Training 
Command (NETC) who is responsible for all accession programs for the Navy. In April 
2017, the Chief of Navy Personnel (CNP) directed a review of the curriculum to address 
the “toughness” of recruits at Recruit Training Command (RTC). RTC held focus groups 
and conversations to understand what it meant to be “tough.” By October 2017, the Recruit 
1.0 curriculum was developed resulting from information gathered in the focus groups and 
conversations. From the onset of Recruit 1.0, as gaps were identified, the curriculum was 
revised continuously. The next step in the program entailed providing a quality-of-life 
survey to the staff. The quality-of-life survey findings revealed that the staff needed 
toughness skills as much as the recruits. The Recruit Division Commander (RDC) training 
began in January 2018 and progressed to what it is today, Recruit 3.0, known as the Warrior 
Toughness Program. (Stallinga et al., 2018). 
The program is based on a U.S. Navy SEAL community concept of the Warrior 
Mindset (Stallinga et al., 2018). Figure 1 illustrates the Warrior Mindset as the cycle of 
commitment, preparation, execution, and reflection. The process of continuously going 
through the Warrior Mindset cycle builds and sustains mental toughness. The process 
begins by examining one’s commitments and thinking through the purpose of what the 
Navy and individual Sailors do. The tough Sailor is one who has firmly studied, committed, 
and prepared to meet the challenge they face to achieve their “best ever” performance 
(Stallinga et al., 2018). Once the task is complete, the Sailor reflects on their performance 
based on the training and commitment. After reflection, the Sailor adjusts training, 
preparation, and commitment as necessary for the next commitment and challenge. This 
process is repeated for every mission and with time, the Warrior Mindset becomes 
engrained as a habit of toughness.  
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Figure 1. The Warrior Mindset process. Source: Stallinga et al. (2018). 
 “Resilience” versus “Toughness” 
The Warrior Toughness program is not modeled as a resilience concept, rather as a 
focus on performance (Lauby et al., 2021). Resilience focuses on preventing negative 
outcomes after challenges and recovery from adversity; the Sailor has suffered a setback 
and works to return to the baseline. Resilience occurs in the period following the stressors 
(Stallinga et al., 2018). Toughness focuses on strengthening the mindset in preparation for 
a critical event or challenge. “Our sailors must be prepared to fight to the death, perform 
complicated and complex tasks under the highest degrees of stress” (Thors, 2018). It is the 
act of preparing a strong mindset with an emphasis placed on improved performance and 
ethical decision making. The toughness model is employed before, during, and after the 
challenge. The implementation and focus are what sets the Warrior Toughness program 
apart from a traditional resilience program. 
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 Developing Toughness 
RTC leadership used the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) Design for Maintaining 
Maritime Superiority, the Navy Leader Development Framework, and the Commander’s 
Intent as guides for direction and core attributes. The lines of effort for development 
centered on the Sailor competence, character, and connections.  
Competence within the Warrior Toughness program is derived from the Sailor’s 
ability to make a mind/body connection while implementing performance and mindfulness 
tasks (Stallinga et al., 2018). Becoming aware of the mind/body connection helps sailors 
regulate stress and achieve peak performance. Warrior Toughness training teaches the 
RDCs and recruits where stress is managed in the brain and gives students the tools of 
mindfulness and meditation to strengthen the part of the brain that controls stress. These 
brain strengthening tools enable sailors to navigate through stressors with calmness.  
Sailor character is developed using the Navy’s core values of honor, courage, and 
commitment and core attributes of integrity, accountability, initiative, and toughness 
(Lauby et al., 2021; Stallinga et al., 2018). These values and characteristics are developed 
in the RDCs and recruits alike through dialogue, instruction, reflection, and sharing of sea 
stories. This training segment highlights the importance of guiding principles, individual 
morals, and ethics to the decision-making process. The natural convergence of these values, 
attributes, and principles aligns under toughness. 
The last piece of the lanes of development is both personal and intellectual 
connections. Personal connections are formed through small group dialogue and the 
sharing of sea stories (Stallinga et al., 2018). The intellectual relationships are developed 
with the help of SMEs, industry leaders, and institutions. Warrior Toughness training helps 
form the personal and intellectual connections for Sailors and inspire a sense of belonging, 
commitment, and connection to the unit, organization, mission, and to one another. 
 Staff/301 Curriculum 
The curriculum begins with training the RDC staff. The purpose for initiating 
training at the staff level is to indoctrinate so they develop a healthy mindset with improved 
quality of life so they are able to develop the character and competence to execute the 
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Warrior Toughness curriculum (Stallinga et al., 2018). To develop character, the staff is 
taught the warrior mindset through the toughness principles of commitment, preparation, 
execution, and reflection. Through the character lens, the attributes of core values and 
moral/ethical living are examined and an effective method to tell a sea story is taught. With 
the competence lens, staff are taught the theory of mind-body connection, emotions, 
mindfulness, and the “Big Four” performance psychology tenets:  goal setting, energy 
management, mental rehearsal, and self-talk. Figure 2 illustrates the organization of the 
curriculum for the RDC staff. 
 
Figure 2. Staff Curriculum. Source: Stallinga et al. (2018). 
The goal is to converge both competence and character within the staff to build 
toughness (Stallinga et al., 2018). Curriculum 301 is a seven-and-a-half-hour program 
taught to the staff by all three members of the Warrior Toughness team:  warrior (U.S. 
Navy SEAL), chaplain, and psychologist. The training’s desired outcome is for the staff to 
understand the mechanisms that drive their stress, recognize their own stress response, and 
effectively manage their stress to care for their minds, bodies, and souls. It is important to 
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note that “the warrior” is a U.S. Navy SEAL while the recruit Sailor attends RTC. Once 
the Sailor is assigned to an organization in the fleet, “the warrior” is a person in a leadership 
position within their own job specialty or rate. 
 Recruit/101 Curriculum 
The recruit training curriculum is an over ten-hour program taught by ship’s 
officers and chaplains to Navy accessions individuals through the Recruit Training 
Command (RTC), Officer Candidate School (OCS), and Navy Reserve Officer Training 
Corps (NROTC), and the U.S. Naval Academy (Lauby et al., 2021; Stallinga et al., 2018). 
In the same fashion as in the staff training, the program is channeled through developing 
character and competence in the recruits. For the character piece, recruits are given the 
opportunity to examine the Navy core attributes, values, and ethics through sea stories. In 
the competency channel, recruits focus on daily and just-in-time exercises that are taught 
by RDCs and instructors “[m]uscle memory, as it relates to reps and sets, builds physical 
toughness. Applied exercises done over time or as in practice, builds mental 
toughness…we need reps and sets in all three areas in order to build muscle, mental and 
soul strength” (Thors, 2018). Figure 3 illustrates how training is organized for recruits. 
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Figure 3. Recruit Curriculum. Source: Stallinga et al. (2018). 
The recalibrate portion of the training deserves a brief explanation. It is an “on-
command” exercise which recruits are taught in the first week of training (Stallinga et al., 
2018). It teaches recruits a technique to slow their breathing which in turn slows their heart 
rate. This exercise triggers a calming response in the brain and allows the brain to focus on 
the task at hand. After only a few days of practice, any staff member can use the 
“recalibrate” command as a reminder to recruits. Recruits are trained while they cannot 
stop what they are doing or experiencing, they can control their reaction and increase their 
focus through a simple breathing technique. 
 Warrior Toughness Outcomes 
The Warrior Toughness applied exercises were tested through various Institutional 
Review Board (IRB) approved research studies (Stallinga et al., 2018). All studies showed 
the applied exercise led to an improvement in “on-time” graduation rates with the recruit’s 
first assigned division. These marked improvements translate to a decrease in the time it 
takes to train recruits as well as less associated costs. Studies also showed the applied 
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exercises led to an improvement in baseline Physical Fitness Assessment (PFA), swim 
qualifications, and inspections. Sailors indoctrinated with the Warrior Toughness training 
(character development and applied exercises) displayed a sense of belonging and 
increased devotion to their organization. Though initial results of the Warrior Toughness 
training may be subtle; the change does not diminish its positive impact on Sailor 
psychological health and to the Navy as a whole. The initial eight-week program is a small 
investment as sailors are better prepared for the personal, mission, and operational 
challenges they will face in the future. Figure 4 illustrates the marked improvements of 
recruits who have gone through the program. 
 
Figure 4. Warrior Toughness Outcomes. Source: Stallinga et al. (2018). 
 Future Efforts 
Warrior Toughness future efforts will focus on three major areas. First, pursue 
improvements within RTC based on feedback and guidance from Dr. Andrew Van Schaack 
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of Vanderbilt University (Stallinga et al., 2018; Thors, 2018). The input will serve to revise 
both the 101 and 301 curriculums and develop and certify all RDCs in quality control 
processes. Moreover, there is a notion of creating an Advanced Toughness Trainer (ATT) 
with a Job Qualification Requirement (JQR). Second, push the Warrior Toughness program 
outside RTC to the Naval Service Training Command level. This effort would require 
modification of the 101 and 301 curricula for the feasibility pilot at Officer Candidate 
School (OCS), Navy Reserve Officer Training Corps (NROTC), Indoctrination (INDOC), 
and Sea Trials. Last, creation of follow-on training. This effort would include partnering 
with A-schools with a pilot program at the Naval Nuclear Power Training Command 
(NNPTC) to develop a 201 curriculum. This expansion could serve as a model program for 
other training commands. In addition to implementation at all accession programs within 
the Navy, Warrior Toughness has proceeded to expand its program into operational units. 
2. Expanded Operational Stress Control 
E-OSC was established by the NAVADMIN 222/19 in September 2019. “E-OSC 
integrates COSC with resilience and mindfulness training to improve the psychological 
readiness of Sailors and units” (DON, 2019a). E-OSC is an expanded version of first 
comprehensive resilience program, OSC, which combines principles from Mind, Body, 
Resilience (MBRT) training, the Chairman’s TTF, and DOD and Navy instructions with 
the original tenets to enrich the program. Additionally, the E-OSC developers utilized the 
wealth of literature from resilience researchers to help identify factors that could be used 
by Service members in recovery from stressful situations. Researchers identified evidence-
informed factors to enhance resilience such as positive coping, positive affect, positive 
thinking, realism, behavioral control, physical fitness, and altruism (Meredith et al., 2011). 
E-OSC incorporated some of these vital factors in the program’s training curriculum. 
E-OSC was developed by the Naval Center for Combat & Operational Stress 
Control (NCCOSC) in collaboration with OPNAV N17 and is “based on best practices for 
managing combat and operational stress and for building resilience and mental toughness” 
(Delaney, 2020). E-OSC Program is also part of the 21st Century Sailor Office (OPNAV 
N17) Behavior Development & Performance Branch (OPNAV N171). “The E-OSC 
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program is designed to inform and empower Sailors, to identify signs of distress and 
difficulty coping within themselves and others, as well as to know where to turn for help” 
(DON, (2019b). The approach “will leverage command resilience teams (CRT) and 
engaged deck plate leaders to provide more accessible, collaborative resources and real-
time assessments of unit culture to promote healthy command climates and mitigate 
challenges from common stressors like relationships, career transitions, disciplinary or 
legal issues, performance issues and financial strain” (DON, 2019b). NAVADMIN 332/20 
announced a phased roll-out for the program, which is required of all Navy command by 
January 2022; however, the roll out to most ships will begin as early as summer 2021. 
The Navy’s OPTEMPO often results in combat and operational stress that can lead 
to negative psychological effects in Sailors and degradations in unit readiness (Delaney et 
al., 2020a). E-OSC objectives align with preparing and supporting Sailors and operational 
units when faced with stressful events. The core objectives aim to “build resilience and 
develop self-care techniques; support identification, mitigation and management of stress 
reactions as needed to maintain mission and personal readiness; and connection with 
services” (Gerardi & Tellez, 2020). The E-OSC program elements are integral in the 
successful implementation and execution of the E-OSC training curriculum.  
 E-OSC Logic Model 
The E-OSC logic model was developed with the end state in mind. The end state 
being to meet the E-OSC short, intermediate, and long-term objectives for a functional E-
OSC training program. Functionality is assessed by the metrics developed to reach the 
desired outcomes through activities like training provided to the operational units. The goal 
the E-OSC Logic Model is obtained by leveraging resources to meet the goal to “strengthen 
and reinforce the psychological health and readiness of operational units” (Delaney et al., 
2020a). OPNAV N17 provides the policy, planning, and funding needed to launch and 
sustain the program and BUMED M333 holds the responsibility for the development of 
the curriculum, establishment of initial E-OSC Instructor Trainers (ITs) and providing 
training materials (Delaney et al., 2020a). Resources are critical for successful 
implementation of the program to include the trainers, leadership support at all levels, 
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marketing materials, and the Stress-O-Meter (SoM), which will be discussed later (Delaney 
et al., 2020a). The program must also work in concert with other Sailor readiness programs 
such as DAPA, SAPR, FAP, SP, PRP, and CMEO.  
Numerous activities are conducted after the resources are in place. The most 
important activity is the establishment of the E-OSC trainers and partnership building with 
the CRT. These will be the personnel who conduct the actual training at the Command 
INDOC and other training events. Some of the training topics and material to include the 
Stress Continuum Model, Core Leader Functions, Combat Operational Stress First Aid 
(COSFA), and Resilience Building, buddy care supports, unit assessments, and SoM 
administration will be described in detail below (Delaney et al., 2020a). 
The actions described above lead to various outputs that when assessed with metrics 
are integral in meeting outcomes. A variety of outputs are used for each of the individual 
outcomes that aid in meeting the goals under three main outcomes:  short-term, 
intermediate, and long-term (Delaney et al., 2020a). The activities outputs have targets/
goals that must be met in order to reach status of a functional E-OSC Training Program. 
Some of these goals include the number of unit CRT members trained, number of E-OSC 
topics taught, number of departments/personnel trained, number of buddy care supports, 
and number of unit assessments completed (Delaney et al., 2020a). The SoM 
administrations should be performed quarterly while there should be at least two outreach 
events accomplished through a health promotion and safety standdown (Delaney et al., 
2020a). The number of collaborations with other programs should be maximized to the 
greatest extent possible. Whether the outputs meet the outcomes that will be described 
below will be assessed using specific metrics. 
The outcomes aim to reach specific goals based on their individual timeframe. The 
goal of the short-term outcome is establishment of a unit that has E-OSC capability and a 
functional E-OSC training program (Delaney et al., 2020a). There are four short-term 
outcomes that should be met relatively early in the program, which are increases in number 
of service members trained in the E-OSC, increases in buddy care supports, increases in 
unit assessments, and regular practice of E-OSC skills by service members (Delaney et al., 
2020a). The metrics used to assess these outcomes are the same for the first three, which 
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is a Program Status Survey (PSS). The last outcome is based on results from the 
Servicemember Metric Survey (SMS) (Delaney et al., 2020a).  
The intermediate outcomes focus on improving servicemember readiness. 
Intermediate outcomes such as increases in toughness, increases in resilience, increases in 
connectedness, improvements in stress management, and increases in healthy behaviors 
utilize the SMS metrics for assessment (Delaney et al., 2020a). Increases in trust in 
leadership and unit use not only SMS but also the Defense Organizational Climate Survey 
(DEOCS). Last, decreases in the stigma of seeking help is developed using three metrics:  
PSS, SMS, and DEOCS (Delaney et al., 2020a). 
The long-term outcomes deal with improving unit readiness. Four of the long-term 
outcomes, improvements in retention and improvements in advancement/promotion rates, 
decreases in destructive behaviors, and decreases in unplanned losses, utilize command 
data as an assessment tool (Delaney et al., 2020a). Next, improvements in Physical 
Readiness Test (PRT) are captured with Physical Readiness Information Management 
System (PRIMS) data. Last, improvements in SBs are an outcome that is assessed with 
SMS and DEOCS (Delaney et al., 2020a). 
 Program Elements 
The E-OSC program has six primary components once fully implemented to 
include Understanding Stress, Building and Preserving Resilience, Core Leader Functions, 
Combat and Operational Stress First Aid (COFSA), Buddy Care and Unit Assessment, and 
the Stress-o-Meter (SoM) (Giraldi & Tellez, 2020). Three important elements of the 
program, the E-OSC team, command training, and command consultation and support, are 
detailed below (Giraldi & Tellez, 2020). 
 E-OSC Team 
An E-OSC team should be identified to provide training and implement the 
program within each Navy operational organization. The team should consist of a team 
leader (E-7 or above), assistant team leader (E-6 or above), and team members (minimum 
E-5) (Giraldi & Tellez, 2020). The command program will be implemented and 
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administered by an E-OSC team lead with support from the CRT. The E-OSC team will 
receive training commensurate with their position to enable their ability to train the 
organization (Giraldi & Tellez, 2020). 
 Command Training 
The E-OSC team is responsible for the command training for the organization. The 
team leaders will receive the most comprehensive training of all the team members in a 
two-day course that consists of all the E-OSC Course Modules listed below (Gerardi & 
Tellez, 2020). Other E-OSC team members and unit leaders will be trained based on their 
position within the organization. The E-OSC team conducts general command training that 
is held at the appropriate level as decided by command leadership, for example the 
departmental/divisional level, duty section, all hands, or at command indoctrination 
(Giraldi & Tellez, 2020). The Self-Care/Resilience Training course module is delivered in 
these venues and are designed as universal prevention to support understanding stress and 
building resilience (Giraldi & Tellez, 2020).  
Second, the E-OSC team trains the CRT in Buddy Care with some CRT members 
also trained in Unit Assessment (Giraldi & Tellez, 2020). The CRT works in concert with 
the E-OCS team, but is mainly focused on command climate. Finally, the E-OSC team 
provides training to the deck plate leaders to include the Wardroom, CPO mess, Leading 
Petty Officers, and Work Center Supervisors (Giraldi & Tellez, 2020). These “extenders” 
need to have an understanding and be willing to support the E-OSC as well as receive 
training in five specific modules:  SoM, Buddy Care, Unit Assessment, COFSA, and Core 
Leader Functions (Giraldi & Tellez, 2020). Once fully trained, the CRT and deck plate 
leaders are leveraged by the E-OSC team to provide “more assessable, collaborative 
resources and real-time assessments of unit culture to promote healthy command climates” 
(Giraldi & Tellez, 2020). The E-OSC Course Modules are summarized from the E-OSC 3 
pager [PDF]:  
1. COSC principles (Giraldi & Tellez, 2020) 
 Stress & Resilience:  Understanding stress and the Stress Continuum 
Model as a tool to identify, engage, and intervene when stress reactions 
38 
occur. Understanding resilience and how the four main domains of life, 
physical, mental, social, and spirit, influence resilience. 
Figure 5 represents the Stress Continuum Model that is utilized by both the Navy 
and the Marine Corps.
 
Figure 5. E-OSC Stress Continuum Model. Source: Expanded Operational 
Stress Control (n.d.). 
• COFSA:  Understanding how to use the action steps, check, coordinate, 
cover, calm, connect, competence, and confidence, for the timely 
assessment and preclinical care of stress injuries. 
• Core Leader Functions:  Understanding how to use the functions, 
strength, mitigate, identify, treat, and reintegrate, to reinforce leader 
commitment to Sailor psychological health and organizational 
resilience.  




Figure 6. E-OSC Core Leader Functions. Source: Expanded Operational 
Stress Control (n.d.). 
• Buddy Care:  Way that peers can support individuals who are 
experiencing difficult times by engaging them providing an early 
intervention strategy that normalizes the process for seeking help. 
2. Self-Care and Resilience Building (Giraldi & Tellez, 2020) 
• Mindfulness:  Understanding what it is, the different types, such as 
meditation, diaphragmatic breathing, progressive muscle relation, and 
benefits of its practice. 
• Navy Values:  Review of Navy Core Values, Navy Ethos, and Core 
Attributes and Signature Behaviors and their influence on resilience. 
• Valued Living:  Personal values influence on Sailor attitudes, beliefs, 
and behaviors and how they align with Navy Values. 
• Emotional Intelligence (EQ):  Understanding EQ as an important 
leadership element, how it can be improved, and its benefits. 
• Flexible Thinking:  Understanding how it induces consideration and 
awareness of possible options in developing strategies to cope and adapt 
to issues and challenges. 
• Healthy Behaviors:  Understanding how to increase physical resilience 
through mind, social, and spiritual domains and the health benefits of 
sleep, nutrition, and exercise. 
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• Problem Solving:  Understanding active problem solving as a process 
of finding solutions using SMART goals to difficult or complex issues 
and to cope with adversity and life challenges. 
3. Command Consultation  (Giraldi & Tellez, 2020) 
• Unit Assessment:  Understanding the purpose of a Unit Assessment and 
how it can be used as a leadership tool to evaluate the overall 
functioning and stress health of a unit. 
• Stress-o-Meter (SoM):  Understanding how to use the SoM as a web-
based resource tool to provide a confidential & anonymous real-time 
“snapshot” of a units stress level.  
• Program Implementation & Course Planning Command Consultation 
and Support:  Identifying key elements to effectively implement the E-
OSC program at the unit level. Understanding the requirement for 
conducting an E-OSC Trainer course. 
The SoM is installed on the organization’s SharePoint. Individual Sailor responses 
are anonymous unless they request assistance via the SoM outlook email. Buddy Care 
requests and interactions are confidential unless there is a mandatory reporting situation 
(Bardales et al., 2020). Additional components of the E-OSC program, Buddy Care, Unit 
Assessment, and the SoM, are described above in various E-OSC Course Modules. The 
program should also work in concert with other Sailor readiness programs as stated in the 
E-OSC Logic Model. 
 Baseline Evaluation 
The E-OSC program evaluation method entails collecting metrics, consisting of the 
SMS and PSS, which were mentioned in the E-OSC Logic Model (Delaney et al., 2020a). 
According the the Baseline E-OSC Program Report for 13 APRIL 2021, “The SMS is a 
self-report assessment completed by Sailors that measures individual readiness domains, 
such as toughness, resilience, trust, connectedness, feeling comfortable providing and 
asking for support, signature behaviors (SBs), and healthy behaviors. The PSS is completed 
by the E-OSC team that collects information about the type and number of E-OSC program 
activities that have been conducted throughout the command” (Delaney et al., 2020b). 
These metrics are collected at four points after implementation of the program. Once the 
data is gathered, the Navy utilizes a Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS) to 
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analyze it (Delaney et al., 2020b). The results are used to compare Sailor responses to 
measures for: toughness, resilience, ability to manage stress, trust, connectedness, support, 
healthy behaviors, and command SBs (Delaney et al., 2020b).  
The baseline report examined how many Sailors received E-OSC training and  
identified the venue used to conduct the training. The report broke down the the completion 
of SMS by department and rank. Additionally, Sailors are asked if they found the training 
helpful and if they had used skills taught in the training or thought they might use them in 
the future (Delaney et al., 2020b). For the command, the evaluation is a way to gain insight 
into the pulse of their command. The report documented what E-OSC topics were covered 
in trainings, current unit phase, other program collaborations, major command events, and 
whether or not the E-OSC program was perceived as beneficial or if there were any barriers 
to implementation (Delaney et al., 2020b). Finally, the report discussed the way forward 
for the E-OSC program activities and administration and completion of the SMS and PSS 
in future iterations. 
 Future Efforts 
In addition to the fleet wide implementation of the E-OSC program and further 
expansion of the Warrior Toughness program, OPNAV N17 is working with various 
mental health professionals on development and implementation of an alternative 
operational stress continuum. Research shows that resilience is not only required during 
stressful events. The Navy is researching how to achieve optimal performance from Sailors 
in the fleet. The current stress continuum model consists of the traditional red, orange, 
yellow, green that is illustrated in the right half of the bell curve depicted in Figure 7 below. 
This is the current Stress Continuum Model utilized by both the Marine Corps OSCAR 
program and the E-OSC SoM model. While the point of concern occurs during the yellow 
section of the stress level, portions of the blue, when an individual is underperforming, can 
be cause for concern also.  
The model presented in Figure 7 shows that optimal performance requires some 
stress; however, there is a point where too much stress can degrade performance (Defense 
Health Agency, n.d.). This model developed by the Defense Health Agency uses a modified 
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Stress Continuum slide overlaid with the Yerkes Dodson curve. This stress optimization 
model has been discussed as a potential replacement for the original stress continuum 
model for the E-OSC and possibly the OSCAR program in the future. 
 
Figure 7. Optimal Performance Stress Continuum. Source: Defense Health 
Agency (n.d.). 
3. Summary 
E-OSC is the Navy’s attempt to catch up with the other military services resilience 
efforts, particularly the Army and Air Force. The Navy created many quasi-resilience 
programs in the past, but E-OSC is the first true fleet-wide resilience program to be 
implemented in the history of the Navy. While E-OSC is still in its infancy phase, early 
data is presented in the from the pilot program shows encouraging successes that hopefully 
can translate to future program success.  
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C. ARMY COMPREHENSIVE SOLDIER AND FAMILY FITNESS 
RESILIENCE PROGRAM 
After more than nine years of soldiers rotating in and out of the combat zone, the 
burdens of frequent deployments manifested in soldier performance, readiness, and 
personal relationships (Casey, 2011). Army leadership recognized the need to fortify the 
physical and psychological health of soldiers, family members, and Army civilians. The 
Army introduced the Comprehensive Soldier Fitness (CSF) program in August 2008 in 
response to Soldiers’ stress due to nearly a decade of fighting. The Army has a rich tradition 
of taking a proactive approach to Soldier’s health, and the CSF reflects this heritage as it 
focuses on prevention rather than treatment (Cornum et al., 2011). In developing the CSF 
program, the Army turned to professionals in the field of psychology to explore how to 
build upon the existing resilience among soldiers. The following paragraphs will explain 
the intricacies of the program. 
1. Comprehensive Soldier Fitness Framework 
In understanding the CSF broadly, it is important to note a few key aspects of the 
program. First, the CSF is a training and education initiative broken down into five areas:  
physical, social, emotional, spiritual, and family (Casey, 2011). Second, The CSF training 
is accessible by soldiers, families, and Army civilians via in-person and online instruction. 
Last, the CSF is a dynamic program developed to meet a person’s psychological resilience 
level. The Army used a “four-pillared approach” to implement the system. The four pillars 






The goal of the CSF is to begin the shift of the stigma against mental health that 
exists within the warrior culture—at the same time, elevating the importance of mental 
fitness to that of physical fitness (Casey, 2011). By approaching resilience as a training 
program rather than medical treatment, it helps dissolve the stigma of weakness. The CSF 
intends to be a long-term strategy that is part of the Army experience and spans a Soldier’s 
career (Cornum et al., 2011). The CSF offers the flexibility of meeting the Soldier where 
they are in their career while providing the skills and training to overcome challenges 
across any rank and career length. Those skills and training improve the fabric of the Army 
and once they are integrated back into society, improves the fabric of society. 
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2. Comprehensive Soldier Fitness Program Evaluation 
The CSF Program is an evidence-based effective program. According to the CSF 
Report #3, the CSF program showed improvements in soldier resilience and psychological 
health (R/PH) in those soldiers who had been exposed to the program (Lester et al., 2011). 






First, “do Soldiers in units that received training from MRTs report higher R/PH 
scores than Soldiers who were not trained by MRTs?” (Lester et al., 2011). Findings show 
that soldiers who were exposed to the MRT training “scored significantly better on 
Emotional Fitness and five of the nine scales that were used to measure Emotional Fitness” 
(Lester et al., 2011). Additionally, there was a significant improvement in the scores for 
the Social Fitness dimension. There were no significant improvements on scores for Family 
or Spiritual Fitness. The report concluded that there was evidence suggesting that the MRT 
training positively impacted Emotional and Social Fitness.  
Second question, “over time, do the R/PH scores of Soldiers exposed to MRT 
training improve at a greater rate than Soldiers not exposed to the training?” (Lester et al., 
2011). Results indicated that for Soldiers exposed to the MRT training, there was improved 
Emotional Fitness while the control group showed no significant difference. Furthermore, 
the Soldiers who received MRT training had reduced catastrophic thinking while Soldiers 
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who had not received the training had no significant change. Another notable change 
identified was related to the Soldier’s character scores. Those exposed to the MRT study 
had no significant change to their character scores while those who had no exposure to the 
MRT study had a drop in score. The hypothesis for this anomaly is that there is a natural 
decay in character but having the MRT training helped prevent the decay. 
Third question sought to explore, “which demographic or contextual variables, if 
any, enhance the effectiveness of MRT training?” (Lester et al., 2011). The researchers 
analyzed two demographic variables, gender, and age, and two contextual variables, 
leadership, and unit cohesion, to evaluate any significant MRT training effects. The 
regression analysis indicated that age was a significant factor in the effects of MRT 
training. It indicated that MRT training was most effective on Soldiers between 18–24 
years of age, with effectiveness declining after age 24 (Lester et al., 2011). There were no 
significant indicators suggesting that MRT training influenced the variables of gender, 
leadership, or unit cohesion.  
Last, the researchers sought to find the impacts of MRT training by asking, “does 
the effectiveness of the training depend on whether MRTs formally train their units:  is the 
training more effective when MRTs feel better prepared to train and when they feel they 
have the support to of their command?” (Lester et al., 2011). Analysis showed that when 
an MRT received formal training, displayed self-confidence to teach the subject matter, 
and had the support of their command, it resulted in better R/PH scores of young Soldiers. 
The results of this inquiry suggest formal training, MRT efficacy, and command support 
are all crucial factors in the CSF program. 
The CSF Report #3 offered evidence that there were positive outcomes in the CSF 
Program; however, all subjects were not affected in the same manner. Army researchers 
and CSF program developers could benefit from these results by using them as a guide to 
help adjust and correct areas found deficient. One area of plausible improvement is to adapt 
training to increase the effectiveness of the MRT training on soldiers over the age of 24. 
While it is theorized that soldiers in the older demographic have already developed 
resilience skills through life experiences, focusing in on improving those skills could help 
prove or disprove the theory. The factors of Family and Spiritual Fitness could also be 
47 
adjusted to increase the effectiveness of the program. Using the CSF assessment provides 
researchers the opportunity for continual refinement.  
3. Critiques of the Comprehensive Soldier Fitness Program 
Critiques of the Comprehensive Soldier Fitness Program concluded that the 
findings were incomplete, and concerns surrounding the CSF program culminated in 
Congressional inquiries (Eidelson & Soldz, 2012). In the Ethical Psychology report, 
authors Roy Eidelson and Stephen Soldz found that concerns ranged from a $31 million 
no-bid contract to improperly promoting religion through the “spirituality” component of 
the program. The authors took issue with the CSF Report #3 and psychologist Martin 
Seligman’s Penn Resiliency Program (PRP), the CSF’s foundations. The report refers to a 
comprehensive meta-analysis of the PRP whose findings reveal that the PRP’s 
effectiveness was difficult to measure. When the authors shifted their focus to the CSF 
Report #3, they raised concerns about the assessment’s disregard of “important outcomes 
of PTSD, depression, or other psychological disorders despite the availability of validated 
measures for doing so” (Eidelson & Soldz, 2012).  
The methodology, data analysis, and interpretation of the findings in the CSF 
Report #3 was also deemed problematic (Eidelson & Soldz, 2012). Eidelson & Soldz 
questioned the methodology of a “weaker quasi-experimental approach by choosing which 
units would include a Master Resilience Trainer” over the use of the standard randomized 
controlled trial. The observers’ concern regarding methodology was that the “treatment” 
and control groups were not comparable. Upon closer inspection of the CSF Report #3, 
they found  “half of the soldiers who received CSF training were deployed during the time, 
whereas soldiers who did not receive the training tended to be non-deployed” (Eidelson & 
Soldz, 2012). The authors made a firm recommendation that the CSF leadership should 
either issue a public correction to the record or retract CSF Report #3 (Eidelson & Soldz, 
2012). 
In a separate critique of the program, analyst Nicholas J. L. Brown noted that the 
CSF program was mandatory for all active-duty service members and reservists. Soldiers 
failing to participate in the CSF program faced disciplinary action. Brown observed that 
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the adverse effects of a forced program upon soldiers escaped paramount concern in the 
CSF. The validity of the results was compromised when participation in the completion of 
the GAT was involuntary. Involuntary participation made it impossible to differentiate 
between participants who were genuine or acted in their own best interests (Brown, 2015).  
Eidelson shed light on the importance of conducting randomized controlled trials 
on small groups to eliminate any seemingly “positive program’s” potential adverse effects 
(Eidelson, 2011). He referenced a study conducted by Joan McCord titled Cures That 
Harm: Unanticipated Outcomes of Crime Prevention Programs as evidence to back his 
observation. McCord’s study reported that well-intentioned, well-planned programs did 
not guarantee safety or efficacy (McCord, 2003). For this reason, Eidelson expressed 
concern over a mass rollout of a program without a prior control group study. The CSF 
program critiques were essential and valuable in the learning process. Other military 
services can apply the Army resilience program’s lessons to avoid repeating mistakes in 
their future resilience initiatives.  
4. Army Resilience Today 
Today, the Army has an active website called Army Resilience Directorate, in 
which there is a tab labeled Ready & Resilient (R2). “Ready and Resilient is the Army’s 
strategy for strengthening individual and unit personal readiness by providing training and 
resources to the Army Family” (Army Resilience Directorate, n.d.). Visitors to the website 
are met with an impressive wealth of information on various resilience topics:  deliberate 
breathing, conflict resolution, strengthening relationships, mindfulness, among other 
subjects. There are options to select in the menu if a person wants to enhance their 
resilience or become an MRT. Additionally, the website offers Army soldiers and civilians 
a source to request training at their nearest R2 performance center. The Army Resilience 
Directorate is a one-stop-shop for Army soldiers, family members, and civilians to seek 
self-help and support. An observation made while researching the resiliency resources for 
each of the branches of service is that the Air Force Resilience website and the Army 
Resilience Directorate website are robust and share many parallels suggesting shared ideas. 
49 
D. MARINE CORPS OPERATIONAL STRESS CONTROL AND 
READINESS (OSCAR) PROGRAM 
In response to the 1999 U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) Directive 6490.5 on 
combat stress–control programs, Marine Corps leadership designed the Operational Stress 
Control and Readiness (OSCAR) program. “In the Marine Corps, combat/operational 
stress control programs fall under the direction of the Deputy Commandant for Manpower 
& Reserve Affairs, not the Marine Corps’ medical support agency, the Navy Bureau of 
Medicine and Surgery” (Nash, 2006). The Marine Corps recognized that “in order to 
improve prevention, early identification, and optimal management of adverse stress 
reactions, both in training and during operational deployments,” military leaders and 
mental health professionals needed to come together (Nash, 2006). A greater partnership 
between the warfighter and the psychological health personnel was a critical component to 
developing and implementing the OSCAR program at Camp Lejeune, North Carolina, in 
1999. The program has evolved over the years and is currently in Generation III. 
1. OSCAR Program Framework 
The OSCAR program was innovative and distinct compared to prior military 
efforts. It embedded mental health providers, mainly psychiatrists and psychologists, 
directly into operational units at the regiment, Air wing, and logistics group level (Nash, 
2006). In the past, mental health professionals were attached to medical treatment facilities 
or external combat stress teams, which required Marines to seek help outside of their 
command. Unfortunately, seeking mental health has a negative connotation in the military 
profession. The mental health professionals assigned to the regiment supported the Marines 
through training, deployment, and post-deployment. The mental health providers extended 
their reach and increased capability by developing OSCAR teams. The OSCAR teams 
complemented “the Marine Corps tradition of small-unit leadership by training select 
Marine Corps leaders to identify and assist Marines affected by combat-related stress,” to 
include Marine officers, NCOs, and medical and religious professionals (Vaughan et al., 
2015).  
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As the program evolved, the OSCAR teams were embedded with the battalions and 
companies on deployment as far forward as allowed (Nash, 2006). The foundation for the 
OSCAR approach to operational stress is the Combat and Operational Stress Continuum 
(COSC) Model, which has been identified for a critical update by the Navy recently. This 
issue will be further discussed in Chapter IV. The COSC has three main goals:  “prevention, 
identification, and treatment of stress problems arising from military training and 
operations” (USMC, 2016). COSC has two objectives: “to create and preserve a ready force 
and to promote the long-term health and well-being of individual Marines and Sailors and 
their family members” (USMC, 2016). These objectives have strategic importance in 
meeting the mission of winning wars and returning Marines home safely.  
While the goal is to keep individuals in the green zone, operational stress often 
pushes them to the right into the yellow, orange, and red zones. The program’s purpose is 
to make sure when individuals move to the right, they return to the green zone as quickly 
as possible. Leaders utilize the Decision Matrix to assess Marines’ operational stress during 
operations anytime along the stress continuum (Stress Continuum and Decision Matrix, 
n.d.). This matrix helps leaders make decisions based on an individual’s symptoms and 
severity. Figure 8 illustrates the COSC zones that describe the responses operational stress 
has on an individual. Figure 9 shows the Decision Matrix, which includes the stress 
symptoms, severity evaluation criteria, and actions for each severity level.  
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Figure 8. Combat Operational Stress Continuum. Source: Stress Continuum 
and Decision Matrix (n.d.). 
 
Figure 9. The Decision Matrix. Source: Stress Continuum and Decision 
Matrix (n.d.). 
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Leaders need to monitor and continually assess Marines within their units for 
responses to operational stress throughout a deployment cycle. Marines and family 
members can do their part by continuously tracking the stress continuum model for 
themselves and others (USMC, 2016). This model is insufficient alone to improve 
psychological health and does not meet the two COSC objectives discussed above. 
According to the MCTP 3-30E, to integrate the continuum model and the objectives, the 
Marine Corps and Navy created five core leader functions:  strengthen, mitigate, identify, 
treat, and reintegrate (USMC, 2016). These five leader functions as described by the MCTP 







2. Program Evaluation 
The Defense Centers of Excellence for Psychological Health and Traumatic Brain 
Injury requested an evaluation of the OSCAR program by RAND in 2010 (Farmer et al., 
2015). RAND focused on the OSCAR program’s performance as it pertains to Marines’ 
experiences in conflicts with high exposure to combat and extended deployments in Iraq 
and Afghanistan. RAND conducted a large survey of Marines who were preparing for 
deployment to Iraq or Afghanistan.  
54 
“The OSCAR evaluation had two primary aims: (1) to determine the impact of 
OSCAR on such outcomes as stress-related attitudes, help-seeking for stress problems, and 
mental health and alcohol use problems, and (2) to determine Marine Corps leaders’ 
perceptions of OSCAR’s impact on attitudes toward stress response and recovery; unit 
cohesion and morale; stigma around mental health and help-seeking; and unit leaders’ 
abilities to prevent, identify, and manage stress problems in the unit” (Vaughan et al., 
2015). There were four components to the evaluation: the individual Marine survey, 
OSCAR team members survey, Marine focus groups, and interviews with Battalion 
Commanding Officers who received OSCAR training.  
If properly implemented, the OSCAR program is expected to positively affect long-
term outcomes after deployment for the Marines to include better mental health, lower 
levels of alcohol use, and lower levels of functional impairment (Vaughan et al., 2015). 
Figure 10 depicts a logic model that illustrates the OSCAR program’s desired outcomes 
from pre-deployment to deployment then finally post-deployment. 
 
Figure 10. Oscar Logic Model. Source: Vaughan et al. (2015). 
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 Individual Marine Survey 
The Individual Marine Survey was given to 1,307 Marines in units deploying to 
Afghanistan or Iraq between March 2010 and December 2011 (Vaughan et al., 2015). The 
study compared Marines in battalions that received OSCAR training and Marines in 
battalions that did not receive the training. Both Marines groups were surveyed before and 
after deployment to assess their individual psychological and behavioral health, stress-
related attitudes, and behaviors. 
The survey results suggest that the OSCAR program met some of its intended 
effects on the pre-deployment and deployment outcomes, but there is no evidence that the 
long-term post-deployment outcomes were met (Vaughan et al., 2015). The Marines in the 
OSCAR trained battalions were more likely to report they sought help from leaders, peers, 
and medical within the battalion than the control battalions. However, the program did not 
have the intended effect on Marines to seek formal medical care for long-term outcomes 
such as mental health, substance abuse, and quality of life for stress response and recovery 
after deployment.  
The findings reported did not consider that the control battalions were combat 
service support and the OSCAR trained battalions were infantry (Vaughan et al., 2015). 
The OSCAR trained battalions were more likely to have been in stressful combat situations 
than the control group due to the inherent difference in their jobs. This is likely the culprit 
for the observed help seeking within the OSCAR trained battalions. The comparison of the 
groups, the main focus of evaluation, “reflects the incremental contribution of OSCAR 
over and above the stress-related training that all Marines receive” (Vaughan et al., 2015). 
Additionally, variation within just the OSCAR trained battalions was analyzed and there 
were “significant differences across the OSCAR-trained battalions in changes over time on 
all of the outcomes examined, providing support for the hypothesis that the implementation 
of OSCAR might have varied among battalions” (Vaughan et al., 2015).  
 Team Member Survey 
The OSCAR team member survey was designed to assess the program’s perceived 
impact by each of the members pre- and post-deployment (Vaughan et al., 2015). The 
56 
participants in the survey were from the same battalions that completed the individual 
Marine survey. Survey participants generally were positive about the OSCAR program’s 
ability to manage operational and combat stress through positive influence over mission 
readiness, unit cohesion, and overall morale before deployment. Interestingly, the same 
participants revealed that OSCAR had less effect than had been intended post-deployment. 
One major issue for the team members was the lack of requests for assistance for stress-
related problems before or after deployment. They had expectations that they would apply 
the principles learned during OSCAR training before deployment.  
 Focus Group with Marines 
Focus groups with the Marine Corps members sought to get feedback on how the 
OSCAR program affects the culture (Vaughan et al., 2015). The groups were led by a 
RAND researcher that started with a set of questions to foster discussion regarding combat-
related stressors and the OSCAR program. Focus group participants provided 
recommendations for improving the management of combat stress issues within the Marine 
Corps. The groups were comprised of OSCAR-trained team members and Marines who 
were the intended beneficiaries, who provided various experiences and knowledge about 
the program.  
The Marine participants agreed “combat stress is a problem but emphasized that 
combat stress management has always been an important part of Marine Corps culture” 
(Vaughan et al., 2015). Two criticisms from the Marine participants were 1)the OSCAR 
program was a formal way of dealing with combat stress management that had been met 
by informal means in the past and 2)OSCAR training was lumped in with multiple other 
combat-related stress and noncombat training, which was seen as excessive and redundant 
(Vaughan et al., 2015). The peer-to-peer approach had the greatest effect and was the 
preference of those in the focus groups. Again, the importance of effective leadership and 
peer support were viewed as critical factors in dealing with stress management (Vaughan 
et al., 2015). Consensus of the participants was stigma surrounding mental health still 
existed which often prevents those in need from seeking help. They also stated that 
unnecessary overemphasis on stress response could lead to an individual receiving the 
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wrong level of care (Vaughan et al., 2015). These issues if not properly managed, they will 
not only affect the mental health of the individual, but also unit readiness of the command. 
The focus group members who had experience with the OSCAR program observed 
its value as a way for the Marine Corps to respond to combat-related stress issues (Vaughan 
et al., 2015). The program worked with existing support networks and provided a common 
language that all Marines could universally understand, which is one of the characteristics 
this report has identified as being key to successful program implementation. These 
members favored having OSCAR team members who had experience with the OSCAR 
program in the past as they were more knowledgeable about the principles.  
 Interviews with Commanding Officers 
Battalion commanders are uniquely positioned to affect the lives of the Marines 
under their command. It is their responsibility to make sure the Marines receive the 
training, support, and treatment needed when dealing with operational and combat stress. 
Their perspective is significant in understanding how management views the OSCAR 
program’s effectiveness as they can observe all Marine reactions to combat stress in the 
battalion (Vaughan et al., 2015). RAND conducted 18 interviews with battalion 
commanding officers who had received OSCAR training to get their input on whether 
OSCAR addressed the Marines’ needs in their battalions, respectively, and 
recommendations to improve the program. 
Marine commanders viewed the management of operational and combat stress as 
an effective leadership issue and not a medical, mental health issue (Vaughan et al., 2015). 
The commanders had favorable OSCAR opinions as they believed the principles were in 
line with those of effective leadership. Open communication about combat stress 
experiences and peer support without interference from external entities were cornerstones 
of the program in which the commanders applauded (Vaughan et al., 2015). They echoed 
the same sentiment as the Marine focus group in that they preferred peer support rather 
than formal mental health support and that common language used in the program was 
beneficial. Regarding training, the commanders recommended training more junior 
Marines and not limiting the training to NCOs. Like the Marine focus groups, the 
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commanders stressed the importance of having OSCAR team members with combat 
experience who were able to recover and lead a successful career (Vaughan et al., 2015). 
The study results were positive in regard to OSCAR providing tools and resources 
for operational and combat stress control. However, as noted in the comments by many of 
the Marines surveyed, OSCAR did not have the intended effect on key outcomes affecting  
stress-related attitudes or health-related outcomes as described in its mission (Vaughan et 
al., 2015). The RAND study concluded “this evaluation did not find evidence of OSCAR’s 
effectiveness that would support the continuation of OSCAR in its current form” (Vaughan 
et al., 2015). The variation and inconsistency of implementation between the OSCAR 
trained battalions and control group and even within the OSCAR-trained battalions made 
it difficult to capture the true data to properly analyze the program. RAND provided 
recommendations on how the Marine Corps could move forward in their quest to manage 
combat and operational stress. These recommendations, which should only be regarded  as 
subjective, were only based on the qualitative components of the study that were also 
utilized with other research on the subject. Moreover, RAND prefaced the 
recommendations with a disclaimer that they had not been tested and the viability for 
Marine Corps adoption was unknown due to “organizational, policy, regulatory, and 
budgetary constraints” “ (Vaughan et al., 2015).  
3. Marine Resilience Today 
The Marine Corps is currently in Team Training Generation III for the OSCAR 
program as of January 2020. MARADMIN 045/20 provides guidance for the 
implementation of the training program and establishes minimum requirements for 
battalion and squadron trained OSCAR team composition. According to the MARADMIN 
045/20 (2020), “OSCAR GEN III designed to provide selected Marines, Sailors, medical 
professionals, religious ministry teams, and mental health professionals information and 
resources needed to help Marines and Sailors prevent, identify, and manage combat and 
operational stress issues as early as possible, before they become medical problems.” The 
training course stresses OSCAR principles and features practical applications, discussion, 
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and critical thinking scenarios (USMC, 2020). Marines must be certified as a master trainer 
by Headquarters Marine Corps (HQMC) to facilitate the OSCAR GEN III training.  
E. AIR FORCE RESILIENCE PROGRAM 
The Air Force adopted the Defense Centers of Excellence for Psychological Health 
and Traumatic Brain Injury (DCoE) definition of resilience, which is “the ability to 
withstand, recover and/or grow in the face of stressors and changing demands” (Meadows 
et al., 2015). This definition underlines the implications that resilience is an ability that is 
not a stable, unchanging quantity; it can not only recover after a stressor but also flourish 
by growing. Hence the Air Force views resilience as a process that is not stagnant, but 
changes over time. The Air Force understood the importance of resilience after the 
enduring conflicts and realized a need to revamp their programs.  
The Air Force Instruction 90–5001 Integrated Resilience was published January 
25, 2019, in response to the RAND study, to be discussed in detail next, DODI 1342.22, 
and CJCS 3405.01. The instruction “establishes guidance for resilience and the primary 
prevention of interpersonal and self-directed violence (hereafter violence prevention) 
programs” as well as responsibilities of Air Force personnel at various levels (Department 
of the Air Force (AF), 2019). The Integrated Resilience instruction states, “resilience 
focuses on the Total Force’s quality of life and their ability to withstand, recover, and grow 
in the face of stressors and changing demands to accomplish the Air Force mission” (AF, 
2019). The Total Force (TF) consists of all personnel who make up the Air Force to include 
service members, civilians, and their families. In response to negative effects on the Total 
force, “The Air Force established the Integrated Resilience Directorate (AF/A1Z) at the 
headquarters level to integrate and consolidate programs and activities that support 
resilience and violence prevention” (AF, 2019). The instruction highlights five major tenets 
to include: 
• Recognizes that programs and activities that support resilience and 
violence prevention are key elements of the Comprehensive Airman 
Fitness (CAF) framework. This framework supports the well-being of 
Total Force members while sustaining their ability to accomplish the 
Air Force mission.  
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• Establishes command relationships, authorities, and responsibilities that 
empower leaders and Airmen to foster dignity, mutual respect, 
inclusion, and trust.  
• Assigns roles and responsibilities to Air Force stakeholders and 
functional agencies. This includes Major Command (MAJCOM) 
Community Support Program Managers (CSPM), installation 
Community Support Coordinators (CSC), MAJCOM Violence 
Prevention Program Managers (VPPM), and installation Violence 
Prevention Integrators (VPI).  
• Provides the authority and criteria to establish and implement Air Force, 
MAJCOM, and installation Community Action Boards (CAB) and 
Community Action Teams (CAT). 
Establishes requirements for programs and activities that support 
resilience and violence prevention (e.g., training and education). 
(AF, 2019). 
While the instruction encompasses many programs that make up the integrated 
resilience concept, it highlights the Comprehensive Airman Fitness (CAF) framework. 
“CAF is a holistic, strength-based, and integrated framework that plays a role in sustaining 
a fit, resilient, and ready force” (AF, 2019). The framework is a cultural shift on how the 
Air Force views and maintains fitness to include mental, physical, social, and spiritual 
domains. The resilience program fits in with the framework as it “equips Airmen with the 
knowledge, skills, and tools required to continually assess and adjust to their environment” 
(AF, 2019). The Resilience Program is led by the MAJCOM CSPMs and installation CSCs, 
but it takes the vigilance of all Airmen to understand and recognize distress symptoms for 
themselves, fellow Wingmen, and families (AF, 2019). The CSCs oversee the Resilience 
Program and are considered the installation SMEs. Resilience training is conducted by 
MRTs and Resilience Training Assistants (RTA) by using approved curriculums. Leaders 
and supervisors are the first line defense in reinforcing Air Force Core Values, promoting 
a healthy culture encouraging early help seeking, and ensuring resilience training is 
completed by all Airmen. They are required to know the signs of distress and effective 
ways to discuss issues with their Airmen. They are encouraged to coordinate all resilience 
issues and requests for further training with the CSCs to make sure the proper tools and 
support are available to all Airmen under their purview. 
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In addition to the instruction, the Air Force has a dedicated resilience website that 
provides resources needed for the Airmen, Guardians, and their families to thrive through 
enhanced well-being, optimized human performance, and promotion of a culture that 
exudes dignity and respect (U.S. Air Force Resilience, n.d.). The Air Force resilience 
program provides leadership tools for crisis prevention, intervention, and postvention to 
support the TF. The program’s objective is to provide skills, resources, and tools for 
military members and their families to meet demanding challenges to enhance resiliency 
and develop a better version with each challenge. The program seeks to encourage 
members to seek help when needed and promote connectedness so others can recognize 
signs of distress to enhance the total force’s support (U.S. Air Force Resilience, n.d.).  
The Air Force Resilience website outlines other Air Force programs, including 
Suicide Prevention Program, Sexual Assault Prevention and Response, True North, 
Resilience Tactical Pause, and Spouse Resilience Toolkit. These programs work in concert 
with the Resilience program to provide Airmen and their families with the tools they need 
to support themselves and others. Finally, the Air Force Resilience website includes contact 
information for helping agencies and local assistance for those seeking help. In fiscal year 
2011, the Air Force commissioned RAND to conduct a literature review on their behalf as 
they did not have the manpower or expertise to conduct one (Meadows et al., 2015). The 
goal was to help the Air Force understand how to assess and track the force’s total fitness, 
which was outlined in the concept of TFF established by the previous CJCS Admiral 
Michael Mullen. Furthermore, RAND was asked to aid in the development of programs to 
increase the resilience of military and civilian Air Force personnel and their families 
(Meadows et al., 2015). RAND’s approach focused on resilience resources or factors that 
would help to promote resilience through systematic efforts by the Air Force. RAND 
conducted a thorough literature review and sought to adapt the individual TFF domains 
discussed in the CJCSI 3504.01: medical, nutritional, environmental, physical, social, 
spiritual, behavioral, and psychological. The research identified several key themes among 
the resilience literature according to the RAND study: 
• Resilience can be studied only in the context of stress. 
• It is a process, rather than a static set of traits or characteristics. 
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• Individuals do not have a static, set amount of resilience or resilience 
resources or factors. 
• Key resilience resources/factors broadly include personality factors, 
behaviors, external resources, and biology/physiology. (Meadows et al., 
2015). 
RAND established seven recommendations to strengthen Air Force initiatives’ 
current and future resilience through a comparison of Air Force practices and the research 
literature. The RAND study published the following recommendations: 
• Promote regular unit physical activity and hold commanders 
accountable for the physical fitness of their military personnel. 
• Better resource Health and Wellness Centers to increase capacity for 
targeted interventions by subject matter experts.  
• Continue to leverage Wingman Day 1. 
• Add a Programs and Services tab to the Air Force Base website 
template. 
• Increase sharing of resilience-related data across the Air Staff. 
• Fill gaps in data collection. 
• Strengthen the ability of the Air Force Resilience Office (which 
preceded the Comprehensive Airman Fitness Office) to promote 
resilience factors across the force. (Meadows et al., 2015). 
RAND’s literature research aided in developing recommendations for how the Air 
Force can build resilience capacity. RAND determined the capacity can be developed 
through “understanding which factors shape the experience and interpretation of stressors, 
responses to stressors, and associated changes to well-being and resilience resources, if 
any, following the event”  (Meadows et al., 2015). The Air Force has further developed 
their resilience programs and initiatives from the RAND study output described in more 
detail above. 
F. ANALYSIS 
The isolation of programs hinders the Navy’s ability to move to scale. There are 
two different organizations in charge of the two initiatives, which have different leadership, 
goals, and objectives. The Table 1 is a visual representation of the assessment for the 
organization’s resilience program as measured by the key characteristics of a successful 
program as described in Chapter IV. An X in the box is representative that the 
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organization’s program possesses that characteristic. Absence of an X means that that 
characteristic is deficient in the organization’s program. 
















 Navy Army Air Force Marine Corps 
Common 
Language 
 X X X 
Integration  X X X 
Point of Entry X X X X 
Training X X X  
Leadership X X X X 
 
1. Navy Initiatives 
The Navy Warrior Toughness and E-OSC initiatives are both established programs 
flourishing in separate domains with different objectives and no immediate plans to 
converge. The Warrior Toughness is found in most Navy accessions programs with plans 
for expansion into the U.S. Naval Academy in the summer of 2021. The E-OSC initiative 
predominately exists at the operational unit level and fleet. Warrior toughness is focused 
on performance psychology, while E-OSC is focused on resilience. Warrior Toughness has 
emerged in a limited capacity into the fleet recently, specifically on the USS ROOSEVELT 
(CVN 71) (Lauby et al., 2021). While the programs are distinct, they both exist under the 
umbrella of psychological health, which may explain why some people confuse Warrior 
Toughness for a resilience program.  
The autonomy of the initiatives encourages misalignment in language. The Warrior 
Toughness program promotes speech that teaches mindfulness; developing, fortifying, and 
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institutionalizing toughness; and is performance focused. Toughness concepts do not 
completely align with the training objectives of the E-OSC program. Both programs aim 
to add value to the overall health of Navy units but due to their similarities, they risk 
confusing Sailors. These two programs are introduced at different times within Sailors’ 
careers and since each use their own concepts and language, it may lead to nonacceptance 
due to the appearance of redundancy or unnecessary training.  
The initiatives overlap in some areas such as incorporating mindfulness and 
promoting Navy values into their programs; however, there is no clear path forward for 
complete integration of the programs in the fleet. In addition, such similarities pose the risk 
of elimination of one program should resources become constrained. In speaking with the 
E-OSC team representatives, they acknowledge that there are no indications of integration 
with the Warrior Toughness program as of this report. However, there has been initial 
conversations for select members to attend each other’s training. 
E-OSC and Warrior Toughness have found an effective point of entry for 
implementing the programs in their respective domains. Both programs use the “train the 
trainer” method in their training approach, which has been established by other programs 
as an effective means. Initial responses to the training method have been positive for both 
initiatives. RTC staff has become indoctrinated in the Warrior Toughness training, while 
the E-OSC team consists of organizational unit Sailors who received training from the 
regional E-OSC trainers. 
Both Navy initiatives are successfully implementing training throughout the fleet 
even though only the E-OSC initiative has been directed to be implemented in all 
operational units. While the Warrior Toughness was developed to be executed at the 
accessions programs, it has creeped into the fleet realm by integration at NNPTC and 
onboard the USS ROOSEVELT and other ships. E-OSC could move to scale once the 
program is fully implemented in the fleet, which is scheduled for early 2022.  
In the E-OSC program’s initial 2019 announcement, Vice Adm. John B. Nowell, 
Jr., the Navy’s chief of personnel, urged Navy leaders to “make the mental and physical 
well-being of our Sailors a priority and get actively involved in resiliency programs. To 
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properly train everyone for this critical fight, a fight we must wage 24/7, our Command 
Resilience Teams must take a new approach to how they do business with leadership 
engaged for every Sailor, every day,” (Faram, 2020). Leadership buy-in for both programs 
at the top senior level has been established. The next step is making sure all operational 
unit commanders embrace the program and emphasize its relevance to subordinate leaders.  
2. Army’s Comprehensive Soldier Fitness 
The Army’s CSF program is an evidence-based program that has achieved success 
through implementing key characteristics of common language, integration, point of entry, 
and leadership. There are no competing resilience programs in the Army, which allows the 
CSF to establish a common language without interference. Additionally, integration is not 
an issue since the program is autonomous. The program uses the MFTs as the point of entry 
consisting primarily of the NCOs within the unit. The former Army Chief of Staff, General 
George Casey, was a strong supporter of the CSF. The CSF was rated as having high 
leadership buy-in considering General Casey’s robust support was a driving force for the 
CSF becoming a significant program within the Army.  
The CSF delivered universal training that was given to all Soldiers regardless of 
need. The training should have been directed to Soldiers who identified as having an 
elevated risk for maladaptive behavior. Critics of the CSF denounced the universally 
mandated training for all Soldiers as there was no screening process to differentiate those 
who needed an intervention and those who did not. Other program initiatives should 
consider tailoring intervention and treatment because “mandatory participation causes a 
major practical problem in the interpretation of GAT results because a unique confounding 
variable of unknown magnitude has been introduced” (Brown, 2015). According to Brown 
(2015), “CSF is one of the largest single applications of psychological research in history.” 
It provided not only the Army, but other institutions valuable research for designing 
successful resilience programs.  
3. Marine Corps OSCAR Program 
The Marine Corps commissioned a RAND study to provide insight and 
recommendations for their OSCAR program. The OSCAR program has been around since 
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the late 1990s but has not changed much through its “generations.” The Marines use 
common language within its program and does not have integration issues with any other 
competing psychological health programs. In the RAND study, the Marine focus groups 
participants “described how OSCAR is beneficial in that it provides a “common language” 
or “platform” for managing combat stress” (Vaughan et al., 2015). There is, however, 
additional training that contains overlapping training requirements with the resilience 
training that could create an appearance of redundancy. While the program is in its third 
generation, the program has remained consistent in its program objectives.  
The point of entry can be anyone from the OSCAR team who has been trained to 
deal with operational stress. This team has the right cadre of personnel that can relate to 
the Marines in the unit and has the requisite knowledge to care for individuals in need. The 
OSCAR training program involves identifying those in need and reacting appropriately and 
quickly. As discussed in Chapter IV, the work “quickly” can be worrisome as quickly can 
be on a spectrum from hours to years. Regardless, the training has been successful in 
providing Marine units with the tools required to support Marines dealing with combat 
operational stress. Leadership buy-in is extremely important in the OSCAR program. The 
Marines have a culture of small-unit camaraderie where leadership at lower levels are as 
important as the higher levels. Even though the OSCAR program has buy-in from the 
commanders leading the units, it is the leadership at the company levels that has ensured 
program success. 
4. Air Force Resilience Program 
Like the Army, the Air Force has taken the subject of resilience seriously as shown 
in their aggressive actions to include commissioning a study by RAND in 2011. After the 
continuous wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Air Force observed a decline in their Airmen 
and their families’ ability to cope with stress and difficult situations. The Air Force 
established many programs under the umbrella of resilience to provide support and 
resources when needed. The Air Force uses common language and has an integrated 
approach to resilience with their overarching instruction and website that brings all of the 
programs together. The Air Force, however, mainly focuses on suicide and violence 
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prevention instead of utilizing a more holistic approach to resilience. The MRTs and RTAs 
provide resilience training and act as the point of entry for the Airmen. Leadership buy-in 
is a critical component for the Air Force resilience programs. The resilience effort is led by 
a Brigadier General and Chief Master Sergeant, which shows the importance resilience has 
in the Air Force to not only the Airmen, civilians, and their families, but also those outside 
of the organization. 
G.  SUMMARY 
This chapter reviewed current resilience initiatives in the Navy, and other military 
resilience programs. Analysis of the programs was conducted using characteristics outlined 
in the Chapter III methodology. The key factors used as a measurement tool are 
representative of an what constitutes a successful resilience program. The next chapter will 
present the conclusion, recommendations, and further research on resilience.  
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V. CONCLUSION, RECOMMENDATIONS, AND FURTHER 
RESEARCH 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter discusses the conclusion and recommendations based on research and 
analysis provided in Chapter IV. The questions presented in the introduction are answered 
in the conclusion. The chapter will conclude with areas for further research for the Navy 
initiatives. 
B. CONCLUSION 
In the analysis and research of other prominent resilience programs within the 
DOD, it becomes apparent that the Navy has fallen behind the other military services in 
developing, evaluating, and integrating its resilience programs; however, it is postured to 
catch up if the necessary conditions are met, which we describe later. The table presented 
in Chapter IV provides a snapshot of how the service’s resilience programs were rated 
based on the key characteristics that were determined to be vital for a successful resiliency 
program. The research questions this report sought to answer are as follows: 
1. What are the implications of the current Navy programs designed to strengthen 
and improve the psychological health of Sailors and operational units? 
2. What are the programmatic issues that impede the Navy program’s ability to 
move to scale? 
The answers to the research questions are summarized as follows:  Both Navy 
initiatives provide preliminary positive results to strengthen and improve the psychological 
health of Sailors and operational units; however, programmatic issues exist. The Navy’s 
programmatic issues stem from siloed initiatives that work independently under different 
directorates and have different objectives while both operating in the fleet. This presents a 
dilemma for overtasked operational units which must prioritize training. Two separate 
trainings that seemingly have similar impacts to a command could be perceived as 
redundant. The two Navy initiatives emerging with different lexicon and training focus 
could cause confusion and undermine the legitimacy of the programs.  
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Navy leadership has created the opportunity for the Navy programs to move to 
scale. Integration of efforts and collaboration are critical in ensuring the programs work 
efficiently in the operational environment. It is imperative that the resilience programs 
assimilate themselves into the operational fleet tempo without being intrusive on the units 
limited capacity for additional training requirements. In addition, there is no central entity 
that conducts oversight and quality control for the major Navy initiatives and other 
programs under the psychological health umbrella.  
C. RECOMMENDATIONS 
Based on the conclusion the following are the recommendations the Navy 
initiatives could adopt to strengthen and improve their programs.  
1. Integrate, Streamline Navy Resilience Initiatives 
The Navy initiatives should align and simplify the current psychological health 
initiatives to reduce the burden of excessive training requirements within organizations. 
Developing a common language between the programs would help the Sailor graduate 
from an accessions program and have the continuity of language into the fleet. Resilience 
should be part of the professional lexicon for Sailors, and it should be defined properly so 
all individuals understand its meaning.  
An additional benefit to integration is reducing the risk of appearing to be a 
redundant program. While the E-OSC and Warrior Toughness are distinct programs, they 
both achieve comparable improvements to the psychological health of the Sailor. Without 
integration, operational commanders may view the programs as providing similar benefits 
and may be forced to prioritize one program over the other. If integration occurs, the benefit 
of both programs could be delivered in one package to the operational commander and 
eliminate the threat of perceived redundancy. Another option to prevent the optics of 
redundant programs in the fleet environment is if the Warrior Toughness program limits 
their training to the accession programs while E-OSC limits their program to the 
operational units. Even in this scenario, there would have to be some integration between 
the programs so that the “toughness” concepts taught to Sailors during recruit training 
continues to thrive in the fleet. 
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2. Establish an Overarching Authority for Resilience Initiatives 
As described in Chapter IV and in the conclusion, the Navy lacks a single 
overarching authority for all resilience efforts. Currently the two major Navy resilience 
initiatives are under the purview of two separate command organizations. This affects 
interoperability issues between the programs as there is not a positional authority to direct 
coordination or set common objectives and goals. Additionally, there are many smaller 
programs that exist within the resilience realm that are not synced, have not been properly 
vetted, and perhaps should not exist at all.  
Quality control and consistency will be difficult to manage and could become 
troublesome if too many resilience initiatives sprout without proper direction. While there 
are preliminary evaluation methods for the two Navy initiatives, there is not a measurement 
system in place to conduct longitudinal studies on the effectiveness of the programs. It is 
essential that a program office be established and resourced to provide oversight, support, 
and direction to make sure the Navy resilience programs are successfully implemented to 
support the needs of operational units and Sailors.  
D. AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
As programs mature, there will be opportunities to assess the effectiveness and 
efficiency of the Navy initiatives. This is especially true for the E-OSC program since it is 
in the infancy phase with planned fleet-wide rollout set to start the summer 2021. After a 
sufficient amount of data is collected for both programs, further research would be 
beneficial in the study of the long-term effects of the Navy initiatives on the health of 
Sailors and operational units.  
Another area worth exploring is the feasibility of screening potential recruits at 
Military Entrance Processing Station (MEPS). Developing a system to screen potential 
recruits at MEPS could identify those who have already experienced significant stressors 
in their lives or who may not have the capacity to withstand the demands inherent to a 
military lifestyle. Identifying those who are not be equipped to handle the rigors of a 
military career ahead of military indoctrination has the potential to save government 
resources and achieve greater efficiencies.  
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